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Products liability provides the subject matter for a proliferating
mass of legal literature.1 Commentators continually score the anomalies
and inconsistencies of the theories of products liability claims and urge
adherence to some unitary concept.2 A plethora of court decisions only
adds to the confusion.3
Little, if anything, however, has been published on the effect of
dissolution of a corporation which manufactures a defective product on
pre- and post-dissolution products liability claims against (1) the corpo-
rate personnel who participated in the design, manufacture, or sale of
the defective product; (2) the dissolved corporation; (3) the directors
who were responsible for the distribution of the corporation's "net
assets" 4 to shareholders; and (4) the shareholders who received such
assets. The meager body of judicial decisions on the effect of corporate
dissolution further complicates the problems created by the products
liability cases.
Compounding the confusion are the contributions of the com-
mercial law codifiers who drafted Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code on sales, the torts re-restaters who drafted section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the corporation lawyers who, prob-
1 E.g., J. CoTxsErr & R. CART-WRIGHT, CALInRN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS (1970);
S. SCHREIBER & P. RHEINGoL, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1967); Dickerson, The ABCs of Prod-
ucts Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439
(1969); Donovan, Recent Development in Products Liability Litigation in New England:
The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 MAINE L. Rav. 181 (1967); Pasley, The Protection of the Purchaser
and Consumer Under the Law of the U.S.A., 32 MODERN L. R*Ev. 241 (1969); Schwartz,
Products Liability Primer, 33 J. Am. TRIAL LAW. ASS'N 64 (1970); Symposium-Consumer
Protection, 8 SAN DIEGO L. Rxv. 1 (1971); Symposium-Products Liability: Economic Analy-
sis and the Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1970).
2 Pasley, supra note 1, at 257; Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict Products
Liability, 21 CASE W. RIEs. L. Ray. 772 (1970); see text accompanying notes 63-70 infra.
3 See I UNIFo~aR LAWS ANN. § 2-318 (1968, Supp. 1971) (Notes of Decisions); RESTATE-
MNT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Appendix § 402A, at 1-8 (1966).
4 ABA-ALl MODEL Bus. CoRP'. ACT § 2(i) (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
ACT]. "'Net assets' means the amount by which the total assets of a corporation exceed
the total debts of the corporation." Id. When corporate debts, known or unknown, are
not paid before liquidation distribution to shareholders, the shareholders have received
more than net assets to the detriment of creditors.
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ably unaware of all the implications of this codifying and re-restating,
very explicitly dealt in their corporate statutory revisions with pre-
dissolution claims but, as far as post-dissolution claims were concerned,
maintained, at best, a Delphic, and at worst, a Sphinx-like, stance.
I
THEORIs OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS
There are two distinct theories and one hybrid theory of products
liability claims: 5
(1) breach of warranty;
(2) negligence; and
(3) strict liability-a hybrid.
The respective theories are not always clearly distinguishable because
of their considerable overlap and mutual influence., Breach of warranty
is subject to several variations in different jurisdictions. The negligence
theory has received the most consistent treatment. Strict liability has
not even been recognized in many jurisdictions, has been treated as a
tort theory in several jurisdictions, 7 and has been more or less assimi-
lated into the breach of warranty theory in a few jurisdictions.8 All of
the theories, however, share the common goal of achieving the most
satisfactory allocation of risks by balancing the interests of suppliers,
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, users, and even inno-
cent bystanders.9
This article will deal primarily with those aspects of the theories of
products liability claims that are relevant to the effect of corporate dis-
solution on such claims. Under all of the theories, consequential
damages caused by the defect, including personal injuries proximately
5 Pasley, supra note 1, at 241; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rnv. 791 (1966); see Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25
N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 205 N.YS.2d 490 (1969), discussed in text accompanying
notes 51-58 infra.
There is also a theoretical possibility of liability for deceit based on false statements
by sellers. Fraud statutes of limitations usually begin to run when the fraud was or should
have been discovered. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRac. LAw § 213(9) (McKinney Supp. 1970). But see
id. § 203(f).
6 Pasley, supra note 1, at 241.
7 See notes 35-50 and accompanying text infra.
8 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d
490 (1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 51-58 infra. See Jackson v. General
Motors Corp., 441 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1969), overruled by TENN. CoDE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp.
1970).
9 Pasley, supra note 1, at 261; see text accompanying notes 63-69 infra.
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resulting therefrom, would be included in recoverable damages.10 Since
this is a constant, it can be excluded from further consideration. Of
relevance, under the respective theories, are the following issues:
(1) Who might be the claimant?
(2) Against whom might the claim be asserted?
(3) When would such claim or claims accrue?
(4) What would be the applicable period or periods of limitations?
A. Breach of Warranty
The breach of warranty theory is difficult to categorize. Although
warranty is part of the law of sales and the broader law of contracts, its
historical origins are in tort," and the same sale of a defective product
might also involve negligence or strict liability or both. The elements
of the cause of action are sale by the seller (the warrantor) of a defective
product and personal injury to the buyer, his family, household, or
guest, and, dubitante, others (the warrantees).
Claimants. The Uniform Commercial Code, although adopted in
every American jurisdiction except Louisiana, has achieved less than
complete uniformity.
Some thirty-one states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands12 have adopted Alternative A of section 2-318, which provides
that:
A seller's warranty [of merchantability, including fitness for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are sold3] whether express
or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or
household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reason-
able to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
10 UNIFORM COMM.RcALk CODE § 2-715 [hereinafter cited as UCO] (consequential
damages resulting from seller's breach of warranty including injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty) (breach of warranty theory); RSTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-62 (1965) (negligence theory); id. § 402A (strict liability
theory); see Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1021 (1970) (allowance of punitive damages in products
liability cases).
11 Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d
942 (1969); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95 (3d ed. 1964); RE.ATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 420A, comment m at 355 (1965) (warranty was in its origin a matter
of tort liability). Contributory negligence sometimes has been held to be a defense to an
action for alleged breach of implied warranty. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501, 505-10 (1965).
12 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 1
UNIFORM LAws ANN. § 2-318 (1968, Supp. 1971).
Is UCC §§ 2-314(l), (2)(c).
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the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.1 4
Under the much older privity requirement, the warranty runs from a
seller only to his immediate buyer.15 Although section 2-318 "extends"
the warranty to the family, household, and guests of the buyer, this
extension is conservative when compared with some cases which have
held that the warranty "runs with the goods."' 6 Section 2-318, however,
was not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on
whether the seller's warranties extend to persons other than the immed-
iate buyer. 7 A few states have expressly inserted such qualifying lan-
guage in their versions of this Code section.'8
California and Utah, in adopting the Code, completely omitted
section 2-318. Some twelve other states enacted other alternatives for
section 2-318, or a variation, most to the effect that the warranty extends
to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods and who is personally injured by breach of the
warranty. 19
Depending on the local statutory formulation, and its construction,
those who would have a claim for personal injuries resulting from the
defective product usually include the buyer and his family, household,
and guests, and might also include other users or even bystanders. 20
14 Id. § 2-318 (Alternative A).
15 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); see Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). "The assault upon the citadel of privity is
proceeding in these days apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite sub-
ject of juridical discussion." Ad. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445 (Cardozo, C.J.). See also Annot., 75
A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
16 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 805 N.Y.S.2d
490 (1969) (dictum). See also Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d
129 (1965) (5-2 decision).
17 UCC § 2-318, Comment 3. Accord, N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964) (New York
Annot.):
The Code is silent on the question of the liability of manufacturers or whole-
salers to the ultimate consumers. In short, the Code enlarges the number of
prospective plaintiffs in a warranty action but it does not increase the number
of potential defendants. In no way is the Code intended to limit the extension
of warranty protection by the courts to a greater number of plaintiffs or the
expansion of the manufacturer's liability ....
18 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-318 (Supp. 1970); TEx. CODE Bus. & Com. ANN.
§ 2.318 (1968).
10 Alternative B: Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Vermont, Wyoming; Alternative C: Hawaii, Minnesota, North Dakota; other varia-
tions: Maine, Rhode Island, Virginia. I UNIFORM LAws ANN. § 2-318 (1968, Supp. 1971).
See Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privily" Statute: Strict Product. Liability Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. Rav. 804 (1965).
20 Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.YS.2d
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Persons Liable. The manufacturer of a defective product would be
liable for breach of the warranty to his buyer, probably a wholesaler,
who in turn would be liable to the retailer, who would then be liable
to the ultimate purchaser. If the injured claimant were some other user
or a bystander, warranty protection would be less likely. If a defective
component part were supplied by another, the latter would be liable to
the manufacturer, and possibly to others.21 Ultimately responsible
would be the manufacturer, who might be liable directly to the injured
claimant. 22 Corporate personnel selling products in their representative
capacities, assuming they did not make personal misstatements or war-
ranties, or engage in fraud, would not be personally liable for breach
of the corporation's warranty. 23
942 (1969) (person who, by his culpable act, whether it stems from negligence or breach
of warranty, places another person in a position of imminent peril, may be held liable
for any damages sustained by rescuer attempting to aid imperiled victim). See Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) ("mere bystander" who was
brother of purchaser); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1961) (modifying rule that there can be no warranty, express or implied, without
privity of contract, in favor of injured infant son of purchasing father in action against
retail food dealer); Comment, The Bystander's Liberation Front-U.C.C. § 2-318 or Strict
Liability, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 251 (1970). For third-party practice, possible cross-claims,
claims-over, impleading, and vouching-in, see notes 21-22 infra. See also Gentry v. Wilming-
ton Trust Co., 321 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Del. 1970); UCC § 2-607(5).
21 Compare Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (4-3 decision) (liability not extended to manufacturer of component,
since liability of manufacturer provides adequate protection "for the present at least'),
with Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S2d 490
(1969) (liability to others) (4-3 decision on other grounds). See Blessington v. McCrory Stores
Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953) (action against manufacturer of component,
manufacturer of product, manufacturer's selling agents, and retailer); Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d
1016 (1965).
Each seller in the distributive chain makes some implied or express warranty to his
immediate purchaser. Separate claims, for example, by the injured person against the re-
tailer, then by the retailer against the wholesaler, and finally by the wholesaler against
the manufacturer of the completed product, and possibly of a component thereof, can be
consolidated under modem third-party practice, cross-claims, impleading, and vouching-in.
See Shanker, supra note 2, at 776. As to the res judicata effect of a judgment against
one person in the distributive chain on a subsequent action against another in the distrib-
utive chain, see Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 518 (1970).
22 Goldberg v. KolIsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). An intriguing question is whether new causes of action against the
manufacturer arise at each step in the distributive chain on respective tenders of delivery.
As far as the warranties of the manufacturer are concerned, any cause of action against it
would probably accrue when tender of delivery is made by it to the wholesaler and would
extend beyond the immediate buyer to the retailer, consumer, and the latter's family,
household, and guests, and, in some jurisdictions, to other persons suffering personal injury
from breach of warranty. See also note 24 infra.
23 A.B. Corp. v. Futrovsky, 259 Md. 65, 267 A.2d 130 (1970). An officer who, with
authority, contracts in behalf of his corporation is not personally liable on the contract
unless he is also a party or guarantor. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF rx LAW oF CosuorbTvoNs
§ 230, at 447-48 (2d ed. 1970). Nor is a director personally liable under traditional contract
[Vol. 56:865
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Accrual of Claims. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the
cause of action for breach of warranty accrues, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach, when "tender of de-
livery is made," except that where a warranty "explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when
the breach is or should have been discovered. '24
Applicable Periods of Limitations. For breach of warranty, the
Uniform Commercial Code prescribes a four-year period of limitations
from the time of accrual of the cause of action.25 The Code expressly
does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations.26 Although
such provisions follow many patterns, some states expressly provide
for the tolling of statutes of limitations in the case of infancy or other
disability of the plaintiff.27
B. Negligence
A manufacturer of defective products is liable in negligence to
those whom it should expect will use the products or be endangered by
law principles, unless he has personally bound himself as party, surety, or guarantor. Id.
at 430. See also notes 31 & 41 infra.
2- UCC § 2-725(2). See text accompanying note 22 supra; text accompanying notes 43-
58 infra. Quaere, as to the meaning of "explicitly." Some commentators have urged that
warranties, inasmuch as they provide recovery for personal injury, should be considered
prospective and breached when injury occurs. Donnelly, Commercial Law, 1969 Survey of
New York Law, 21 SYRACUSE L. R.v. 569 (1969); 21 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1308, 1312 (1970). At
least one jurisdiction which has adopted the UCC, Alabama, has provided that a cause of
action for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall accrue
when the injury occurs. ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 2-725(2) (1966). Connecticut applies the
shorter of two alternative periods of limitations: (1) three years from date of act; or (2)
two years from date of physical injury. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1970). Cali-
fornia, in adopting the Code, originally omitted § 2-725, believing there was no need for
uniformity in statutes of limitations, and such matters were best governed by local policy.
CAL. Coltar. CoDE § 2725, Comment 2 (West 1964). In 1967 California adopted § 2-725
without change. CAL. Comrf. CODE § 2725 (West Supp. 1971).
25 UCC § 2-725(1). Some jurisdictions have adopted variations, e.g., Mississippi (six
years), Oklahoma (five years). 1 UNiFoRm IAws ANN. § 2-725, at 499-500 (1968). Connecticut
law provides that an action to recover damages shall be brought within two years from the
date when the injury is first sustained or discovered, except that no such action may be
brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1970). Louisiana, which has not adopted the UCC, has a
10-year statute of limitations. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3544-47 (West 1953).
26 UCC § 2-725(4).
27 Compare N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 208 (McKinney 1963) and CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE
§ 352 (West Supp. 1971), with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 35 (1953), which provides no tolling
for personal injury actions. Absent a statutory provision for tolling, there should be none.
Lametta v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 139 Conn. 218, 92 A.2d 731 (1952) (no tolling for
infancy of then one-year statute of limitations from date of act or omission for personal
injuries caused by negligence).
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their probable use, for any resultant physical harm.28 Privity is not
required, but proof of the usual elements of a claim for negligence-
duty, lack of due care, proximate cause, and damage-with the burden
of proof on the plaintiff,29 is required. Among the possible defenses are
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.30
Claimants. Under the negligence theory, claimants are not limited
to the buyer, his family, household, and guests, but, as stated above,
include anyone physically harmed by the use of the product whom the
manufacturer should have expected to use the product or to be endan-
gered by its probable use.
Persons Liable. The person or persons who were negligent (the
tortfeasor or tortfeasors) obviously are primarily liable, and their
liability is not affected by corporate dissolution. For any negligence of
its employees, the manufacturer would be vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.2 '
Accrual of Claims. Causes of action for personal injury resulting
from negligence usually accrue when the physical harm occurs.32
Applicable Periods of Limitations. The period of limitations
28 RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 388-402 (1965); see W. PROSSER, Supra note 11,
§ 96, at 663.
29 Aided, when appropriate, by res ipsa loquitur. See generally Prosser, Strict Lia-
bility to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L. REv. 9, 50-58 (1966).
30 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 463-96G (1955); see W. PROsSER, supra note 11,
99 64, 67; Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH
L. RE V. 267; Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965).
31 Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng'r Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 175 N.E. 123 (1931) (president
of corporation not liable absent proof that he designed defective product or knew, or had
reason to know, of such defect); See also Wines v. Crosby, 169 Mich. 210, 135 N.W. 96
(1912) (president personally liable for active participation in manufacture of dangerous
product sold without warning); RLESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-67 (1965).
Where a tort is committed by a corporate officer, the officer, as tortfeasor, is individ-
ually liable to the injured person whether or not he was acting within the scope of his
employment. If the tort is committed by the officer within the scope of his employment,
the corporation is also liable-vicariously or secondarily under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. The officer, of course, remains primarily liable, but might enjoy a right to indem-
nification. H. HENN, supra note 23, § 280, at 448 n.5.
The tortfeasor-director would be personally liable for any tort committed by him, even
when acting in behalf of the corporation, under traditional tort law principles. Id. at 420.
See also note 23 supra; note 42 infra.
32 Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963). For a description of the Connecticut statute, see note 25 supra. From
1901 to 1957, the statute prescribed a one-year period of limitations "from the date of the
act or omission complained of." Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir.
1952) (2-1 decision); Tarbert v. Ingraham Co., 190 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1960); Lametta
v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 139 Conn. 218, 92 A.2d 731 (1952). Cf. Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 501 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969) (where surgical
damps were left in plaintiff after operation, claim held to accrue upon discovery).
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would be the one applicable to causes of action for personal injuries
resulting from negligence, for which most states prescribe two-, three-,
or four-year periods, 3 3 subject, of course, to possible tolling for infancy
or other disability of the plaintiff.3 4
0. Strict Liability
A growing number of jurisdictions, by judicial decision, have im-
posed a special liability on the sellers of certain types of products3 5 for
physical harm to users and consumers. As provided in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
(1) One who sells any products in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.36
33 Twenty-one states prescribe a two-year period for personal injury: Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia. Twelve jurisdictions prescribe a three-year period: Arkansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, New York (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 214 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1970)), North Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and
the District of Columbia. A one-year period applies in Alabama, California, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico. In Florida, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming the period
is four years; in Missouri it is five. The longest period is six years-Colorado, Maine, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Carolina. Connecticut law pro-
vides that an action to recover damages shall be brought within two years from the date
when the injury is first sustained or discovered, except that no such action may be brought
more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1970). See statutes collected in 1 CCH PROD. LIA. REP. 3420
(1970).
34 See note 27 supra.
35 REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(l), comment b (1965). Although this con-
cept originally covered only food for human consumption, it was first expanded to include
products intended for intimate bodily use, and was later extended to encompass any
product which, should it prove to be defective, may be expected to cause physical harm
to the consumer or to his property. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Hoffnan v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267
A.2d 867 (1970); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965);
Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1071-73 (1967).
36 RrSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965). See also Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for De-:
fective Products: The Road to and past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965); Prosser,
supra note 5; PiossER, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YAI.a L.J. 1099 (1960); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. R-v. 363 (1965); Wade, supra note 35; Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1425
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Neither negligence nor privity is required, and it is irrelevant that:
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.3 7
The elements of the cause of action are the sale by the defendant
in the course of business of a product in a defective condition which is
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer with resultant physical
harm suffered by such person from such defect.
Although "warranty" language is found in some opinions,38 the
liability is, according to the Restatement, one of strict liability in tort.3 9
Some commentators, preoccupied with negligence concepts, suggest
that the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
might be applicable.40
Claimants. Any ultimate user or consumer, or possibly even by-
standers and others,4 1 who suffers physical harm caused by any unreason-
(1970) (application of rule of strict liability in tort to person rendering services); Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967); 1 CCH PROD. LA. REP. 4060, at 4026-27 (1970).
37 REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRrs § 402A(2) (1965). See Percy, Products Liability-
Tort or Contract or What? 40 Ttr. L. REv. 715 (1966); Rapson, Products Liability Under
Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability
in Tort, 19 Rurroms L. REv. 692 (1965); Shanker, supra note 2.
38 RESTATEMFNT (SECOND) OF TORT § 402A, comment m (1965).
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted
to a "warranty," either running with the goods sold, by analogy to covenants
running with the land, or made directly to the consumer without contract. In
some instances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Although war-
ranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and it is generally agreed that
a tort action will still lie for its breach, it has become so identified in practice with
a contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that the warranty theory
has become something of an obstacle to the recognition of the strict liability where
there is no such contract. There is nothing in this Section which would prevent
any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user or
consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and understood that the
"warranty" is a very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the
sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract rules which have
grown up to surround such sales.
Id. at 355. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). See also text accompanying notes 49-58 infra.
39 RESTATEmENT (SECoND) Or ToRTs § 402A, comment m at 356 (1965). See I CCH
PROD. LiAI. RE'. 4060, at 4026 (1970).
40 REsrATEME1NT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965); Epstein, supra
note 30; Keeton, supra note 30; Prosser, supra note 29, at 48-50 (1966); Comment, Tort
Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SRAcusE L. REv. 924 (1969); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
1057, 1100-03 (1967). Most of the cases using contributory negligence terminology involve
assumption of the risk. See also Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 851,
253 N.E.2d 207, 214, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 500 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
41 RTArMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, caveat (1965): "The Institute expresses
no opinion as to whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply ... to harm to
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ably dangerous defective product has a claim against the seller for
damages for such physical harm.
Persons Liable. The seller of the product is liable under the strict
liability theory. Corporate personnel participating in the design, manu-
facture, or sale of the product presumably are not liable.42
Accrual of Claims. Accrual of a cause of action depends on whether
the court assimilates the strict liability theory into the breach of war-
ranty theory or the negligence theory. By breach of warranty or law of
sales analogy, the cause of action accrues when "tender of delivery is
made."48 Under tort principles, the cause of action accrues when the
physical harm occurs.44
Courts in only a few jurisdictions have passed on this question.
The supreme courts of New Jersey 5 and Wisconsin,46 an intermediate
appellate court in Illinois,47 and a United States District Court in Ore-
gon48 applying Oregon law, have applied tort principles to hold that
the cause of action under the strict liability theory does not arise until
the time of physical injury. A Tennessee Supreme Court holding to
the contrary49 was overruled by statute.50
Also to the contrary is the controversial New York Court of Ap-
persons other than users or consumers .... " The Restatement broadly defines "user" and
"consumer" (id., comment I at 354) and expressly neither approves nor disapproves of the
expansion of the rule to permit recovery by non-users and non-consumers. Id. comment o
at 357. Many recent cases have permitted such recovery. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 415 (1970).
42 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 402A comment f (1965).
Business of Selling. The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged
in the business of selling products for use or consumption. It therefore applies to
any manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distrib-
utor, and to the operator of a restaurant.
Id. at 350. See also Burbage v. Boiler Eng'r & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969)
(manufacturer of defective component part held liable on strict liability basis to indemnify
manufacturer of product); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1096-1100 (1967). Increasingly, the
doctrine of strict liability applicable to the sellers of defective products has been extended
to lessors. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Cin-
trone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Note, Con-
tractual Freedom and Consumer Protection: A Renewed Inquiry After Price v. Shell Oil
Company, 18 U.C.L.A.L. R-v. 188 (1970). See also notes 23 & 31 supra.
43 See note 24 supra. For discussion of the Connecticut statute, combining both act
and physical harm approaches, see notes 24-25 & 32-33 supra; note 69 infra.
44 See note 32 supra; notes 45-50 infra.
45 Rosenau v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
46 Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
47 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (196 ), rev'd on
other grounds, 45 IMl. 2d. 418, 261 N.E.2d 805 (1970).
48 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Ore. 1968).
49 Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 441 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1969).
50 TmNN. CoDE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1970).
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peals holding in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.r' There the
product was sold and installed in 1958, prior to the effective date in
New York of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the injured plaintiff
suffered physical harm in 1965. The action was commenced in 1967,
alleging causes of action sounding in negligence and based upon alleged
breach of warranty. The lower courts held that the cause of action for
breach of warranty was barred by the then "six year from the time of
sale" statute of limitations. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
The majority of the court construed its earlier holdings2 as having ex-
tended the New York concept of implied warranty by eliminating the
requirement of privity, rather than as having established, as other juris-
dictions had, a new action in tort under the strict liability theory, 3
stating further:
We would merely add that both parties appear to agree, and
we believe correctly, that strict liability in tort and implied warranty
in the absence of privity are merely different ways of describing the
very same cause of action. If we were to adopt a three-year limita-
tions period from the time of the injury, then we would create a
situation where at least those plaintiffs not in privity covered by
section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, would be entitled
to pick and choose between the code's four-year-from-the-time-of-
the-sale, and our three-year-from-the-time-of-the-injury, limitations
period, depending upon which, under the facts of a given case,
would grant them the longest [sic] period of time to sue. Although it
is true that a plaintiff may have two different theories of recovery
involving the same wrong with different limitation periods (e.g.,
negligence and breach of warranty), it would be absurd to have
two different periods of limitation applicable to the same cause of
action, with the same elements of proof, complaining of the very
same wrong.
In conclusion, if the case presented merely an open policy
question, which as evidenced from the discussion above we do not
believe, we would nevertheless affirm. We are willing to sacrifice the
small percentage of meritorious claims that might arise after the
statutory period has run in order to prevent the many unfounded
suits that would be brought and sustained against manufacturers
ad infinitum. Surely an injury resulting from a defective product
many years after it has been manufactured, presumptively at least,
is due to operation and maintenance. It is our opinion that to guard
against the unfounded actions that would be brought many years
51 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
52 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421
(1953).
53 25 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493. Cf. RESTATmMENT (SEC-
OND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965), discussed in text accompanying note 36 supra.
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after a product is manufactured, we must make that presumption
conclusive by holding the contract Statute of Limitations appli-
cable to the instant action and limit appellants to their action in
negligence.54
In view of this case, New York law appears to be that a claim based
on strict liability, since it is merely a different way, in the absence of
privity, of describing a cause of action for breach of warranty, accrues
when "tender of delivery is made."55
The three dissenting judges recognized strict liability as an inde-
pendent theory, contending that such a cause of action accrued at the
time of physical injury.56
The Mendel case may not prove to be a trustworthy precedent be-
cause of the close division of the court, the questionable reasoning of
the majority, their debatable balancing of the interests of sellers and
injured persons, the vigor of the dissent, the contrary holdings in other
jurisdictions, 57 and the critical comments on the holding.5
Applicable Periods of Limitations. The question of the period of
limitations applicable to a claim under the strict liability theory, like
the question of when the cause of action accrues, depends on whether
the court applies the law of contracts (sales) or the law of torts (negli-
gence). If the Uniform Commercial Code is applied, the period is four
years from the time when "tender of delivery is made."59 If tort princi-
54 25 N.Y.2d at 345-46, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95 (Scileppi, Burke,
Bergan & Jasen, JJ.). The majority opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, both parties
did not agree that strict liability and implied warranty described a single cause of action.
The defendant's brief devoted an entire point, six pages, to the proposition that "Plain-
tiffs should not be permitted to assert causes of action for 'strict liability in tort' under the
guise and pleading of causes of action for breach of implied warranty," arguing that breach
of warranty and "strict liability in tort" were "separate and distinct theories of liability,
and they should not be confused with each other." Brief for Defendant at 10-15, Mendel
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
55 25 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494, quoting UCC § 2-725. The
majority, while assimilating strict liability into breach of warranty, expressly recognized
negligence as a distinct cause of action. In short, the majority recognized two separate
theories: (1) breach of warranty, arising on tender of delivery and subject to the four-year
[UCC] statute of limitations; and (2) negligence, arising at the time of physical injury and
subject to the three-year statute of limitations. See Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas
Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964). See also Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305
N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953); Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94
(1936).
58 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 211 (Breitel, J., Fuld, C.J. & Gibson, J., dissenting).
57 See notes 45-50 supra.
58 Symposium on Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 62 (1970); 36
BROOKLYN L. Rav. 507 (1970); 74 DicK. L. REv. 786 (1970); 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 152 (1970);
21 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 1308 (1970); 39 U. CN. L. REv. 413 (1970); 16 Vn.L. L. Rxv. 202 (1970);
27 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 382 (1970).
59 See notes 24-27 &.49, text accompanying notes 5i-55 supra. Connecticut bars actions
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ples are found to control, the period would be that applicable to causes
of action for personal injuries-usually two, three, or four years, 60
commencing when the physical harm occurs.61
Whatever the period of limitations, it, of course, would be subject
to possible tolling for infancy or other disability of the plaintiff.
62
D. Unitary Concept
Commentators on products liability increasingly have advocated
synthesizing a unitary concept, but there is still no consensus as to what
that concept should be.6
3
The three theories coexist because each has its limitations: breach
of warranty is limited by possible disclaimers and vestigial privity re-
quirements; 64 negligence by its burden of proof and defenses; 65 and
strict liability by its possible applicability to only certain kinds of
products 6 and limitations to "consumers" and "users" as potential
claimants.67
The elements of the cause of action under the unitary concept
would depend on the eventual definition of that concept, as would the
time of the accrual of the cause of action.68 Since the eventual theory
probably will not be based on fault, the liabilities of the potential de-
fendants should not be open-ended, but should be subject to a relatively
short statute of limitations,0 9 with shorter periods of limitation for
those more remote in the distributive chain.
Until the products liability experts, with their contracts (sales) and
after three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, or after two years
from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
584 (Supp. 1970). See notes 24-25 & 32-33 supra; note 69 infra.
10 See notes 33-34, text accompanying note 56 supra.
61 See note 32, text accompanying note 56 supra. For a Connecticut statute combin-
ing both approaches, see notes 24-25, 32-33 & 59 supra; note 69 infra.
62 See note 27 sura.
63 See note 2 supra. See also Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and
Communication Barriers, 17 CASE W. R.Es. L. REv. 5 (1965).
64 See text accompanying notes 12-20 supra.
65 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
66 See note 35 supra.
67 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
68 See text accompanying notes 24, 32 & 43-58 supra; note 132 infra.
69 The only extant example provides that:
No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal
property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct ... shall
be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained
or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered,
and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the
date of the act or omission complained of ....
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1970). For open-ended statutes of limitations, see
text accompanying notes 25-27, 33-34 & 59-62 supra. See Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co.,
Vol. 56:865
PRODUCTS LIABILITY & DISSOLUTION
torts (negligence or strict liability) expertise, reach some conclusion,
the puzzled corporation lawyers, concerned with the effect of corporate
dissolution on products liability claims, must base their analyses on the
existing theories of products liability claims.
II
CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
A. Types of Corporate Dissolution
Corporate dissolution statutes explicitly deal with the recognition
and barring of pre-dissolution claims, but with a few, not particularly
well-drafted exceptions,70 fail to mention post-dissolution claims.
Corporate statutes provide for various, somewhat overlapping types
of corporate dissolution: (1) voluntary or nonjudicial dissolution, some-
times with judicial supervision of liquidation;71 (2) involuntary or
judicial dissolution;7 2 (3) expiration of duration;73 (4) forfeiture,7 4 can-
cellation, or annulment of charter; (5) merger, in which the constituent
corporation or corporations other than the surviving corporation are
dissolved;7 5 and (6) consolidation, in which all of the constituent corpo-
rations are dissolved and replaced by the consolidated corporation.76
The following discussion will concentrate on the effect of volun-
tary or nonjudicial dissolution, and involuntary or judicial dissolution.
However, when appropriate, analogies will be drawn to or from the
other types of corporate dissolution.
B. Dissolution Patterns
1. At Common Law and in Equity
Blackstone stated that the dissolution of a corporation at common
law marked its civil death. Debts, either to or from the corporation,
198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952) (former Connecticut one-year statute held to run from time of
sale by manufacturer and to bar claim by non-purchaser injured four years later); Note,
Statutes of Limitations: Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23
VAND. L. Ray. 775 (1970).
70 See text accompanying notes 87-131 infra.
71 MODEL Acr §§ 82-93, 97, 100-01, 103-05; N.Y. Bus. CoRP,. LAw §§ 1001-09 (McKin-
ney 1963, Supp. 1970). See Conversion Table, in OFFICIAL Foams FOR USE UNDER THE MODEL
BusiNass CORP. Acr 110-18 (ABA-ALI rev. ed. 1969). See also H. HENN, supra note 23,
App. A, at 835-38.
72 MODEL Acr §§ 94-102; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1101-17 (McKinney 1963). See
Comment, Involuntary Corporate Dissolution, 5 WIIL.Am L.J. 639 (1969).
73 E.g., MODEL Act § 105.
74 E.g., id. § 94.
73 E.g., id. §§ 71, 74.
76 E.g., id. §§ 72, 74.
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were totally extinguished and its property reverted to the grantor or
escheated to the Crown. 7
Morawetz, in his classic treatise on corporations, qualified this
"death" analogy, arguing that in modern business corporations the
shareholders are the donors of the corporate assets and the corporation
merely the trustee.78 While the common law recognized only the
corporation's legal right or title, equity demanded that the corporate
assets, under the "trust fund theory,"79 should revert to the share-
holders, subject to the superior rights of creditors.80 This view finds
support in the United States Supreme Court's holding in *Curran v.
Arkansas: 81
[T]here is no difficulty in a creditor following the property of the
corporation into the hands of any one not a bona fide creditor or
purchaser... and obtaining satisfaction of his just debt out of that
fund specifically set apart for its payment when the debt was con-
tracted, and charged with a trust for all the creditors when in the
hands of the corporation; which trust the repeal of the charter does
not destroy.82
Although at common law dissolution clearly abated all actions
and barred all claims against the corporation, its creditors with judg-
ments, other liquidated claims, and even unliquidated claims, were
protected in equity under the "trust fund theory."8 3 Assets of a dis-
77 1 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *484. See 2 S. KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS 516 (1794). See also J. ANGELL & S. AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE § 779, at 862 (11th ed. 1882).
78 2 V. MORAWETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1032, at 989
(2d ed. 1886).
79 Several commentators question the use of the term "trust fund theory" to
characterize this fiduciary duty owed creditors and shareholders. See G. GLENN, THE LAw
GOVERNING LIQUIDATION § 156 (1935); Schoone, Shareholder Liability upon Voluntary Dis-
solution of Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 415, 416-17 (1961).
80 V. MORAWETz, supra note 78, at 990.
81 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853). See Hastings v. Drew, 76 N.Y. 9 (1879).
82 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 311-12.
83 See Updike v. United States, 8 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1925) (effect of retrospective
federal excess profits tax on dissolved corporation for period during which it was carrying
on business):
In Wood et al. v. Dummer et al. . . . Mr. Justice Story places a dissolved
corporation, left without property because of distribution to its stockholders, in
the same category with one that is insolvent, and says: "If the capital stock is a
trust fund [and he holds that it is], then it may be followed by the creditors into
the hands of any persons, having notice of the trust attaching to it. As to the
stockholders themselves, there can be no pretence to say, that, both in law and
fact, they are not affected with the most ample notice. The doctrine of following
trust funds into the hands of any persons, who are not innocent purchasers, or do
not otherwise possess superior equities, has been long established."
It has, therefore, been held that the assets of a dissolved corporation may
be followed as in the nature of a trust fund into the hands of stockholders, and
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solved insolvent corporation, under the "trust fund theory," were
deemed to be held in trust for creditors as against all persons except
bona fide purchasers and other creditors. Directors who distributed such
assets in violation of the "trust" were liable to creditors to the extent of
the assets distributed."' Recipient shareholders were liable to creditors
to the extent of the assets respectively received by them.85 Since the
that, where the debt was not judicially established by action against the corpora-
tion before its dissolution, it may be presented and its validity determined in the
equitable suit to enforce such liability of the stockholders .... And this doctrine
has been applied in cases similar to the one before us. .. . All the stockholders
must be made parties defendant.
Id. at 917-18 (citations omitted) (brackets in original). Quaere, as to the validity of the
latter statement. See also Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 86 NARy. L.
REv. 509, 544-47 (1923).
84 See G. GLENN, supra note 79, § 250, at 382; 1 V. MoRAWm, supra note 78, § 568;
2 id. § 795, at 765. In Heaney v. Riddle, 343 Pa. 453, 23 A.2d. 456 (1942), the court stated:
Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their hands without an accounting and an
audit of their accounts do so at their own risk, and when they assume that risk
they must be held responsible for payments made without the approval of the
court which turn out to have been improper ....
Id. at 457, 23 A.2d at 459 (citations omitted). The liquidating directors, as trustees under
the "trust fund theory," like other trustees, were "bound to execute the trust with proper
diligence and care" being "responsible for any injury sustained by [their] negligence or
misconduct." Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 F. Cas. 1040, 1047 (No. 8,581)
(C.C.D. Md. 1848) (Taney, Circuit Justice).
The statute of limitations applicable to claims against distributing directors in New
York would be six years. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 213(1), (8) (McKinney 1963). See In re
Baldwin Trading Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 144, 168 N.E.2d 383, 202 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1960), decided
under former N.Y. Civ. Pc. Acr § 53 (Clevenger 1962) (ten-year period for equitable
actions); Hesson, The Statute of Limitations in Actions To Set Aside Fraudulent Convey-
ances and in Actions Against Directors by Creditors of Corporations, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 222
(1946).
85 J. ANELL & S. AMES, supra note 77, §§ 599-600; 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1660, at 302 (14th ed. 1918). See G. GLENN, supra note 79, § 250, at
382-83. See also Quintal v. Adler, 146 Misc. 300, 262 N.Y.S. 126 (Sup. Ct. 1933), afJ'd mem.,
239 App. Div. 775, 263 N.Y.S. 943 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd mem., 264 N.Y. 452, 191 N.E. 509
(1934) (complaint by corporation's trustee in bankruptcy against shareholders, who had
received improper dividends out of stated capital, dismissed where there were no allega-
tions that dividends were paid while corporation was insolvent or rendered corporation
insolvent, or that shareholders received dividends in bad faith or with knowledge that
they were paid from stated capital); cf. Palmer v. Justice, 322 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Tex.
1971).
For a discussion of the diminution in value of corporate assets distributed in kind,
where deterioration was through the fault of the recipient shareholder, see McWilliam s v.
Excelsior Coal Co., 298 F. 884 (8th Cir. 1924):
Where the stockholder is not responsible for such change, obviously, the creditor
can and must take the trust fund as he finds it, suffering any decrease and securing
the advantage of any increase in value.
How is the rule to be applied when such property has deteriorated through
the fault of the stockholder? One who takes trust property with notice stands in
the position of a trustee and may be held responsible as such.
Id. at 886.
197]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
recipient shareholders were primarily liable,80 any directors who suf-
fered liability should have been able to seek reimbursement from them.
2. Under Model Business Corporation Act
Under the Model Business Corporation Act dissolution formula-
tion,87 which has been adopted substantially in about half the states88
and the District of Columbia, voluntary or nonjudicial dissolution
involves three stages:
(1) filing of "statement of intent to dissolve";
(2) winding up or liquidation; and
(3) filing of "articles of dissolution" and issuance by secretary of
state of "certificate of dissolution."
After filing of the statement of intent to dissolve,89 the corporation must
cease to carry on business except insofar as may be necessary for wind-
ing up.9 0 Meanwhile, corporate existence continues until a certificate
of dissolution is issued or a decree of dissolution is entered.91 Notice of
dissolution is then mailed to each known creditor of the corporation.92
During the winding up period, the corporation may do all acts
required to liquidate its business and affairs.93 Once assets are collected
8 2 V. MORAWErZ, supra note 78, § 795, at 765. See also 4 J. PoMAERoy, EQuITy JURIS-
PRUDENCE § 1417, at 1071 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).
87 For the MODEL Acr DissoLuTioN PRocEDURE TIMETABLE, see APPENDix A infra.
88 Eg., Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See generally H. HENN, supra note 23, § 1, at 6 n.14.
89 MODEL Aar § 85. The statement of intent to dissolve may be by consent of share-
holders (id. § 83) or by act of the corporation, i.e., by board of directors and shareholder
action (id. § 84). If the corporation has not commenced business and has not issued any
shares, it may be voluntarily dissolved by its incorporators upon the filing by them of
articles of dissolution and the issuance by the secretary of state of a "certificate of dissolu-
tion" (id. § 82). Presumably, such a corporation would not have incurred any claims
against it, since it had not commenced business, but there often are pre-incorporation ex-
penses for which the corporation may be liable.
90 Id. § 86. Corporate existence continues until the "certificate of dissolution"
is issued or until the entry of decree of dissolution. Id. For revocation of voluntary
dissolution proceedings by consent of the shareholders or act of the corporation, see id.
§§ 88-89. See also id. §§ 90-91 (filing and effect of statement of revocation of voluntary
dissolution proceedings).
91 Id. § 86.
92 Id. § 87(a). For due process requirements of notice, see Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 806 (1950) (statutory notice by newspaper publication
held sufficient for unknown claimants but insufficient for known claimants).
93 The corporation shall proceed to collect its assets, convey and dispose of such
of its properties as are not to be distributed in kind to its shareholders, pay,
satisfy and discharge its liabilities and obligations and do all other acts required
to liquidate its business and affairs, and, after paying or adequately providing for
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and liabilities are either paid or adequately provided for, the remainder
of the corporate assets may be distributed among the shareholders ac-
cording to their respective rights and interests. 4 At any time during
winding up, an application may be made to continue the liquidation
under judicial supervision. 5
After winding up, articles of dissolution are executed and delivered
to the secretary of state, who then issues a certificate of dissolution if
the articles conform to law. 96 Nonjudicial or voluntary dissolution oc-
curs at this third stage, which thus becomes the demarcation line be-
tween pre- and post-dissolution claims under the Model Act formula-
tion. Upon the issuance of the certificate of dissolution, the existence of
the corporation ceases, except for the purpose of suits, other proceed-
ings, and appropriate corporate action by shareholders, directors, and
officers as provided in the Model Act.97
Involuntary or judicial dissolution proceedings may be com-
menced by the attorney general,9 a shareholder, 9 or a creditor.100 The
corporation, after it has filed a statement of intent to dissolve, may also
seek judicial supervision of liquidation.10 1 The court may require the
filing of claims within designated time limitations and may prescribe
the form of notice to be given creditors and claimants 0 2 Those failing
to file on time may be barred from participating in the distribution of
assets.103 Any receiver of a corporation has the authority to sue and de-
the payment of all its obligations, distribute the remainder of its assets, either in
cash or in kind, among its shareholders according to their respective rights and
interests.
MODEL Acr § 87(b).
94 Id.
o5 Id. §9 87(c), 97(c).
96 Id. §9 92-93. The articles of dissolution shall state, inter alia, that all liabilities of
the corporation have been paid or that adequate provision has been made therefor (id.
§ 92(c)); that all the remaining assets of the corporation have been distributed among its
shareholders (id. § 92(d)); and that no suits are pending against the corporation or that
adequate provision has been made for the satisfaction of any judgment which might be
entered against it in any pending suit (id. § 92(e)).
97 Id. § 93. Whereas the Model Act provides that corporate existence ceases except
for purposes of suit as provided in the Act, the New York statute takes the contrary
approach that the dissolved corporation shall function for purposes of winding up, in-
cluding suits, as if dissolution had not taken place, except as otherwise provided therein
or by court order. See text accompanying notes 116-17 infra.
98 MODEL Aar §§ 94-96, 97(d).
99 Id. § 97(a).
100 Id. § 97(b).
101 Id. §§ 87(c), 97(c).
102 Id. § 100.
103 Id.
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fend in all courts in his own name as receiver of such corporation. 10 4
When the expenses of the liquidation proceedings and all lia-
bilities of the corporation have been paid and all of the remaining
assets of the corporation distributed to its shareholders, or the assets,
when insufficient to satisfy such expenses and liabilities, are exhausted,
the court enters a decree dissolving the corporation.105 At the time of
the entry of the decree, judicial dissolution occurs. All claims accruing
prior to the decree are pre-dissolution claims; unless filed within the
time set by the court, they may be barred.106 The existence of the cor-
poration ceases upon the entry of the decree of dissolution.0 7
If the liquidation of assets is carried out by a court, no statutory
provision is made for the survival of remedies. Otherwise section 105
provides that dissolution shall not impair any remedy by or against the
corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, on any claims incur-
red prior to dissolution if action thereon is commenced within two
years after the date of dissolution. 08 Thus, the corporation has two
years in which to sue, and a claimant whose claim accrues at any time
prior to the issuance of a certificate of dissolution or entry of a decree
of dissolution is given two years in which to commence an action.
Winding up under the Model Act is primarily a pre-dissolution
period. The two-year "survival of remedy" period begins to run after
dissolution and is thus a post-dissolution period. Claims that might
have accrued for or against the corporation in the two-year period were
104 Id. §§ 98-99.
105 Id. § 102.
106 See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
107 MODEL Acr § 102. The clerk of the court is required to file a certified copy of
the decree of dissolution with the secretary of state. Id. § 103.
108 Id. § 105 (applicable to dissolution either by issuance of certificate of dissolution,
or by court order when the court has not liquidated assets, or by expiration of period of
corporate duration). Section 48, entitled "Liability of Directors in Certain Cases," provides
that "[i]n addition to any other liabilities imposed by law upon directors," directors dis-
tributing assets of a corporation without paying or making adequate provision for all
known liabilities of the corporation shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation
for the value of the assets distributed, to the extent that such liabilities of the corporation
are not thereafter paid. Any director against whom such a claim shall be asserted and who
shall be held liable thereon, shall be entitled to contribution from the shareholders who
received any such assets, knowing such distribution to have been made in violation of the
Act, in proportion to the amounts received. Any director against whom such a claim shall
be asserted shall be entitled to contribution from the other distributing directors.
For liabilities of distributing directors and recipient shareholders, see text accompany-
ing notes 145-73 & 210-22 infra. See also Southern Land, Timber & Pulp Corp. v. United
States, 322 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (capacity of corporation to sue under F.D. R. CIV.
P. 17(b) determined by law of the state of incorporation); Illinois Att'y Gen., Opinion
Letter No. NP-242, Dec. 8, 1970 (suggesting two-year suability provision inapplicable to
actions by the state).
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it not for dissolution, unlike claims accruing during the winding up
period, are not covered by the survival provision of section 105. Never-
theless, claims arising during the two-year period possibly can be
asserted by or against the dissolved corporation or against its directors
or shareholders.10 9 Since claims cease to exist after the twofyear period,
no claims thereafter can be asserted by or against the dissolved corpo-
ration or against its directors or shareholders. 110
3. Under New York Business Corporation Law
Nonjudicial dissolution in New York,"1 in contrast to the Model
Act, involves two stages:
(1) filing of "certificate of dissolution"; and
(2) winding up or liquidation.
Prior to 1963, New York provided for a third stage called "termina-
tion," at which time the corporation ceased to exist.112
Dissolution occurs at the first stage, upon filing of the certificate of
dissolution, which filing precedes winding up.113 Thus, the post-dissolu-
tion period begins to run concurrently with winding up under New
109 See Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Iowa 1968), discussed
in text accompanying notes 191-96 infra.
11o See note 196 infra. This assumes compliance with statutory procedures. If there
has not been compliance, liability may continue. The purpose of the two-year period has
been construed as permitting claims which would ordinarily be barred upon dissolution
and suits which would ordinarily abate upon dissolution. Therefore, claims against direc-
tors, officers, or shareholders which would not be barred by dissolution are not barred
after the two-year period. United States v. Palakow, 438 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1971) (Wisconsin
statute held not to preclude suit against director after two-year period for conversion of
liquidation proceeds due pledgee of corporation's shares); People v. Parker, 80 Ill. 2d 486,
197 N.E.2d 30 (1964) (director of dissolved corporation which failed to mail notice to
known creditors held liable for interest on taxes accruing prior to filing of statement of
intent to dissolve); Lindemann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210, 104 N.W. 119 (1905) (action com-
menced within three-year period against dissolved corporation and liquidating director
did not abate but could continue for conversion of corporation's good will).
111 For the NEw YORK DISSOLUTION PROcDuRE TIMETABLE, see APPENDIX B infra. The
dissolution provisions of New Jersey are substantially similar to those of New York.
Complicating the analysis of New York law is a 70-year-old New York Court of
Appeals case, Shayne v. Evening Post Publishing Co., 168 N.Y. 70, 61 N.E. 115 (1901),
where the court allowed a pre-dissolution claim against a dissolved corporation to be as-
serted against the liquidating directors, absent a statute or rule of law barring such a claim.
112 See former N.Y. STOCK CoP. LAW § 105(11) (McKinney 1951). Since the elimina-
tion of this third stage, a New York dissolved corporation could be described as continuing
"in limbo." For an interesting example of a corporation "in limbo," see Arnold, Dissolu-
tion and Liquidation of Arkansas Corporations, 21 ARK. L. REv. 490, 493-94 (1968).
113 N.Y. Bus. CoP'. LAw § 1004 (McKinney 1963). The dissolved corporation shall
carry on no business except for the purposes of winding up. Id. § 1005(a)(1); see note 174
infra.
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York law." 4 After paying or adequately providing for payment of its
liabilities, the dissolved corporation may distribute any remaining
assets among its shareholders.1 5
A dissolved corporation may continue to function for the purpose
of winding up in the same manner as if dissolution had not taken place,
except as otherwise provided in the statute or by court order,"8
including suing and being sued."7 Directors shall not be deemed to be
trustees of corporate assets, and title to such does not vest in them. 18
Dissolution does not affect any remedy available to or against the
corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders for any right or claim
or any liability incurred before such dissolution.119 At any time after
dissolution, the corporation may give notice requiring all creditors and
claimants, including "any with unliquidated or contingent claims and
any with whom the corporation has unfulfilled contracts," to present
their claims within a period of not less than six months after the first
publication of notice 20 Besides publication, copies of the notice must
be mailed "to each person believed to be a creditor of or claimant
against the corporation whose name and address are known to or can
with due diligence be ascertained by the corporation.' 121 Claims not
timely fied are forever barred as against the corporation, its assets,
directors, officers, and shareholders, although the court may, upon the
showing of a satisfactory reason for such failure, allow a tardy claim
against "any remaining assets of the corporation."'122
14 N.Y. Bus. Copi. LAw § 1005(a)(2) (McKinney 1963).
"5 Id. § 1005(a)(a)(B).
11 Id. § 1006(a).
117 Id. § 1006(a)(4). In contrast, the Model Act provides that corporate existence
ceases except for purposes of suit as provided therein. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
118 N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw § 1006(a)(1) (McKinney 1963); see text accompanying note
84 supra.
19 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1006(b) (McKinney 1963). The substance of this section is
based upon § 105 of the Model Act. Id. § 1006 (Legislative Studies and Reports).
120 Id. § 1007(a).
121 Id. See note 92 supra.
122 N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw § 1007(b) (McKinney 1963). See Bernard Semel, Inc. v.
Fleishaker (Sup. Ct. 1970), in N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1970, at 18, col. 5 (denying the motion of
a dissolved corporation for summary judgment dismissing a complaint alleging post-
dissolution damage resulting from pre-dissolution negligence, on the ground that plaintiff
should have opportunity to show satisfactory reason for not filing a timely claim); cf. In re
New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 928, 294 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dep't
1968) (upholding inherent judicial power to permit late filing of claim against dissolved
membership corporation). New York law requires any assets distributable to a creditor or
shareholder who is unknown or cannot be found, or who is under disability and for
whom there is no legal representative, be paid to the state comptroller as abandoned
property. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1005(c) (McKinney 1963). In the light of § 1007 barring
claims after at least six months where the required notice is given, it can be argued that no
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At any time after the filing of a certificate of dissolution, the corpo-
ration or, with court approval, a creditor, claimant, director, officer, or
shareholder, may petition for judicial supervision of liquidation. 23
The provisions for voluntary or nonjudicial dissolution, including
the "suability for purposes of winding up," "survival of remedies," and
"filing and barring of claims" provisions, are applicable also to disso-
lution by expiration of corporate duration or under the New York Tax
Law,124 and, subject to the provisions of article 11, to judicial or in-
voluntary dissolution.'2 5 A corporation is judicially dissolved upon the
filing of a final order of dissolution by the secretary of state.' 26
4. Under Other Corporate Statutes
Some deviations from the above two patterns require mention.
Arizona and Ohio continue corporate liability after dissolution for any
cause which, but for dissolution, would have accrued.127 Thus, no dis-
tinction is drawn between pre- and post-dissolution claims and the
assets are distributable to any creditor who is unknown or cannot be found, and therefore,
no payment to the state comptroller with respect to such creditor is required by § 1005(c).
See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965) (defining states' escheat powers); Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (rev. 1966), 9A UNIFORm LAWs ANN. (Supp. 1967).
123 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1008(a) (McKinney, 1963) literally permits exercise of
jurisdiction by the supreme court to supervise dissolution and liquidation "[a]t any time
after the filing of a certificate of dissolution." The court may issue orders, inter alia, in
respect of the adequacy of the notice given to creditors and claimants and the possible
requirements of further notice (id. § 1008(a)(2)); determination of the validity of claims
presented to the corporation (id. § 1008(a)(3)); barring of all creditors and claimants who
have not timely filed claims or whose claims have been disallowed (id. § 1008(a)(4));
determination and enforcement of the liability of any director, officer, shareholder, or
subscriber to the corporation or of the liabilities of the corporation (id. § 1008(a)(5));
payment of claims against the corporation, retention of assets for such purpose, and
determination of the adequacy of provisions made for payment of liabilities (id. § 1008(a)
(6)); appointment and removal of a receiver under article 12 (id. § 1008(a)(8)); distributions
to shareholders (id. § 1008(a)(10)); and payment to the state comptroller, as abandoned
property, of assets distributable to missing creditors or shareholders (id. § 1008(a)(11)). See
Stephens v. Maust, 11 App. Div. 2d 1004, 205 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't 1960) (nonjudicial
dissolution in which supreme court supervision was involved): "[f]t may also be expedient
to withhold part of the assets to protect any present creditors as well as future creditors
who may present claims as a result of the pending litigation." Id. at 1004, 205 N.Y.S.2d at
913-14.
124 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1009 (McKinney 1963).
125 Id. § 1117.
126 Id. § 1111(d).
127 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-365(B) (1956); OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 1701.88 (Page
1964); see Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961) (Arizona statute continuing corpo-
rate existence for purposes of suit held inapplicable to merged corporations (or to
constituent corporations in cases of consolidation) since all their rights passed to, and all
their liabilities were assumed by, surviving (or consolidated) corporation).
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corporation is relegated to the otherwise applicable statutes of limita-
tions for the barring of claims.128
Other statutes provide for nonimpairment of pre-dissolution
claims, but set no limitation on actions, leaving them subject, of course,
to applicable statutes of limitations. 1 29
Some statutes provide that dissolved corporations shall continue
for the purpose of suing and being sued without time limitations. 130
Other statutes impose such limitation. For example, Delaware law pro-
vides that dissolved corporations shall continue for at least three years
after dissolution,131 thereby permitting actions against them on post-
dissolution claims accruing during such three-year or longer period.
III
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST DISsoLvED CORPORATIONS
A. Differentiating Between Pre-"Dissolution" and Post-"Dissolution"
Claims
The distinction between pre- and post-"dissolution" claims de-
pends upon two sometimes interwoven factors: (1) the time of the ac-
crual of the claims against the corporation and (2) the time of the
"dissolution" of the corporation.
128 See Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965),
discussed in text accompanying notes 186-90 infra.
129 See Miss. CODE ANN. § 5309-212 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-29-24 (Supp.
1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-101 (1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.94 (1965).
130 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5400 (West 1955); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 76(b), 82 (1966,
Supp. 1970); NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.585 (1967); OxLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.188 (1953). Seavey v.
I.X.L. Laundry Co., 60 Nev. 324, 108 P.2d 853 (1941), interpreted the predecessor to
Nevada's current statute to allow plaintiff to sue on a tort claim which accrued after
dissolution although within a then three-year survival period.
131 Dissolution occurs when the secretary of state issues his certificate that the first
stage "certificate of dissolution" or "certificate of consent" has been filed. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §§ 275(b), (c) (1969). Compare Ross v. Venezuelan-American Independent Oil Pro-
ducers Ass'n, 230 F. Supp. 701 (D. Del. 1964), which, relying on the dubious precedent of
Wax v. Riverview Cemetery Co., 41 Del. 424, 24 A.2d 431 (Super. Ct. 1942), allowed an
action against the corporation for attorneys' services rendered within the three-year sur-
vival period, although such action was not commenced within the three-year period, with
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 91-93 (D. Conn. 1958). Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-3606 (1964).
The corporation may continue for longer than the three-year period if a court of
chancery so directs. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (Supp. 1968). For the purpose of actions
commenced by or against dissolved corporations either prior to or within the three.-year
period, dissolved corporations shall "be continued bodies corporate beyond the three-
year period and until any judgments, orders, or decrees therein shall be fully exe-
cuted...." Id.
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Products liability claims accrue at the time of tender of delivery or
at the time of physical injury, depending upon the applicable
theory.132
Complicating the classification of products liability claims as pre-
or post- "dissolution" is the question of when "dissolution" occurs under
applicable law, usually that of the jurisdiction of incorporation. 133 In
the case of voluntary or nonjudicial dissolution under the Model Act,
with its three stages, "dissolution" occurs after winding up or liquida-
tion, at the third stage, upon the issuance of the "certificate of dissolu-
tion." Claims accruing prior to this third stage, under the Model Act
formulation, are pre-dissolution claims; those arising thereafter are
post-dissolution claims.
In contrast, the New York Business Corporation Law prescribes a
tvo-stage nonjudicial dissolution procedure, with "dissolution" occur-
ring before winding up or liquidation, at the first stage, upon the filing
of the "certificate of dissolution." In New York, then, claims accruing
prior to the first stage are pre-dissolution claims, and those arising there-
after are post-dissolution claims.
With respect to other types of dissolution, "dissolution" would
occur as follows:
(1) in the case of judicial dissolution, at the time of the entry of
the decree of dissolution,184 or its filing by the secretary of
state;13 5
(2) in the case of expiration of duration, at such time; 36
(3) in the case of forfeiture, cancellation, or annulment of charter,
at the time of the entry of the decree of dissolution,137 or its
filing by the secretary of state;138 and
(4) in the case of merger or consolidation, at the time the "certifi-
132 See text accompanying notes 24, 32, 43-58 & 68 supra.
133 A dissolved corporation may still be suable in a foreign jurisdiction although no
longer suable in its state of incorporation. Compare Dr. Hess & Clark, Inc. v. Metalsalts
Corp., 119 F. Supp. 427 (D.NJ. 1954), with FED. R. Civ. P. 17. Beyond the scope of this
article are the applicable conflict of laws rules (Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 130 (1961)) and the
amenability to process of the dissolved corporation in jurisdictions other than that of its
incorporation, where it was qualified to do business, where it was doing business, or under
long arm statutes (Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 13 (1968)).
134 E.g., MODEL AcT § 102. Thereafter, a certified copy of the decree of dissolution is
filed with the secretary of state by the court clerk. Id. § 103.
135 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1111(d) (McKinney 1963).
136 E.g., MODEL Acr § 105; N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1009 (McKinney 1963).
137 E.g., MODEL Acr §§ 94, 103.
138 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1111(d) (McKinney 1963). Thereafter, a certified copy
of the judgment or final order is filed with the clerk of each county in which the cor-
poration's certificate of incorporation was filed. Id. § 1111(e).
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cate of merger" or the "certificate of consolidation" is issued
under the Model Act formulation,1 9 or is filed under the law
of New York140 and some other jurisdictions.
B. Liabilities for Pre-Dissolution Claims
Modern corporate statutes expressly deal with the effect of corpo-
rate dissolution on pre-dissolution claims. The unanswered question is
the extent to which common law and equitable principles also apply.
Pre-dissolution products liability claims are those, under the
breach of warranty theory, which accrue upon tender of delivery of the
goods before dissolution; under the negligence theory, upon physical
injury before dissolution; and under the strict liability theory, by negli-
gence analogy, upon physical injury before dissolution, or by breach of
warranty analogy, upon tender of delivery of the goods before dissolu-
tion.
With respect to pre-dissolution claims, the potential liabilities are
those of
(1) the participating corporate personnel;
(2) the dissolved corporation;
(3) the directors responsible for the distribution of the corpora-
tion's "net assets" to shareholders; and
(4) the shareholders who received such assets.
1. Liabilities of Participating Corporate Personnel for Pre-Disso-
lution Claims
Participating corporate officers or other employees responsible for
any pre-dissolution claims, regardless of their possible liabilities in
other capacities as directors or shareholders, would be liable personally
from the time of the accrual of the cause of action. The dissolution of
the corporation would not affect this liability, which would be limited
only by applicable statutes of limitations.
2. Liabilities of Dissolved Corporation for Pre-Dissolution Claims
Apart from any liabilities of corporate personnel, the corporation
would be liable as the party which made and breached the warranty, as
the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior for any
negligence committed by any of its officers or other employees during
the course of their employment, and as the seller of the product under
the strict liability theory.
139 MoDEL Acr § 74.
140 N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAw § 906(a) (McKinney 1963).
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Most corporate statutes expressly provide for the survival of pre-
dissolution claims against the corporation, but limit the time for the
assertion of such claims.' 4 ' Some statutes also preserve the capacity of
the corporation to sue and to be sued for purposes of winding up.142 Still
other statutes continue the existence of the dissolved corporation for
the purposes of suing and being sued, with or without time limita-
tions. 43 Under the Model Act, any action on a pre-dissolution claim
must be commenced within two years after dissolution. New York bars
claims not filed within a specified period of at least six months after
publication of notice requiring the filing of claims after dissolution.
Pre-dissolution claims which are timely asserted should, of course,
be satisfied out of corporate assets. Assuming compliance with statutory
dissolution procedures, pre-dissolution claims which are not timely
asserted would be barred against the corporation, its assets, directors,
officers, and shareholders.
If the corporation has not complied with the statutory dissolution
procedures, the claims would not be barred, and the corporation would
remain liable. If the corporation remains suable but has distributed all
of its assets, any judgment against it could not be satisfied, but could
determine the extent of the corporate liability as a basis for asserting
the claim against the distributing directors or the recipient share-
holders.144 If the corporation is liable and fails to satisfy the claim, the
directors and shareholders might be liable.
141 E.g., MoDFl. ACr § 105. Such "limitations on claims" statutes would bar claims
after the time limit, precluding their assertion not only against the corporation but also
against directors or shareholders. See note 129 supra.
142 See note 117 supra. Quaere, whether winding up continues so long as there are
outstanding claims against the dissolved corporation.
143 Such "limitations on corporate existence" statutes, in contrast with "limitations on
claims" statutes (see notes 130-131 supra), do not bar the claims after the time limita-
tion. Rather, the assertion of claims against the corporation, but not necessarily against
its distributing directors or recipient shareholders, is precluded.
144 Quaere, in the absence of an express statutory requirement, whether the action
should be conditioned upon the prior procurement of a judgment against the corporation.
See J. PoztERoy, supra note 86, § 1415, at 1068. In McWilliams v. Excelsior Coal Co., 298
F. 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1924), the court stated:
This liability may be enforced where the debt has been judicially established
against the corporation in an action against it, but, where the corporation has
ceased to exist, it is entirely proper for the validity of the debt to be presented
and determined in the equitable action to enforce the above liability of the
stockholder.
In New York, a creditor of a corporation, to have standing to sue under N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW §§ 719(a), 720(a) (McKinney 1963), must be a judgment creditor. Id. § 720(b). Prior
to the Business Corporation Law, this procedure was followed, although in Sherill Hard-
wood Lumber Co. v. New York Bottle Box Co., 118 Misc. 636, 195 N.Y.S. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
to avoid a futile gesture, the court allowed joinder of the defendant directors in an action
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3. Liabilities of Distributing Directors for Pre-Dissolution Claims
If pre-dissolution claims are barred against the corporation, they
would also be barred against the directors who were responsible for
the distribution of the corporation's "net assets" to shareholders. Ab-
sent barring, directors might be liable for pre-dissolution claims, 45
although only to the extent of the improper distributions they had
authorized.
Under the common law and in equity, sometimes codified by
statutes, directors, after dissolution, became trustees of the corporate
property for the benefit of the corporation's creditors and share-
holders. 146
Some modern corporate statutes expressly provide that the di-
rectors of a dissolved corporation shall not be deemed to be trustees of
its assets and that title to such assets shall not vest in them but shall
remain in the corporation. 147 While such statutes make it clear that
liquidating directors are not trustees holding the legal title to corporate
assets, they leave open the question of the extent of the remaining
fiduciary duties of liquidating directors to creditors and the extent of
the liabilities of such directors for the breach of -such duties. Under the
"trust fund theory," directors are presumably liable only to persons
whose claims are known or should have been known. Actions there-
under would be subject to laches and statutes of limitations applicable
to equitable claims.148
Corporate statutes often provide that directors who voted for or
against the dissolved corporation. Cf. Thomas v. Harper, - Ariz. -, 481 P.2d 510 (1971)
(absent corporate creditors, dissolved corporation held not indispensable party in action
by shareholders to collect corporate debts). See also notes 161-62 & 207 infra.
145 Heaney v. Riddle, 343 Pa. 453, 23 A.2d 456 (1942) (distributing directors held not
protected by publication of notice of dissolution where they filed no account, as against
claimant with contingent claim under 1919 executory contract against corporation
judicially dissolved in 1928, where liability matured in 1938). See People v. Parker, 30
Ill. 2d 486, 197 N.E.2d 30 (1964) (director of dissolved corporation held liable for pre-disso-
lution claim asserted more than two years after dissolution where notice of dissolution was
not given to creditor); Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 451, 76 Mont. Co.
L. Rep. 296 (1959). Cf. Nav. R v. STAT. § 78.595 (1968) (trustees of dissolved corporation to
be jointly and severally responsible for debts owed by corporation at time of its dissolution
to extent of corporate assets coming into their possession).
146 E.g., former N.Y. Sroc CORP. LAw § 105(12) (McKinney 1951). See also NEV. REV.
STAT. § 78.590 (1968). G. GLENN, supra note 79, at § 251, observes that modern statutes
have to some degree codified the equitable doctrines which ameliorated the harshness of
early corporation law. See also Shayne v. Evening Post Publishing Co., 168 N.Y. 70, 61 N.E.
115 (1901); Marstaller v. Mills, 143 N.Y. 398, 38 N.E. 370 (1894); J.F. Tapley Co. v.
Keller, 133 App. Div. 54, 117 N.Y.S. 817 (Ist Dep't 1909).
147 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1006(a)(1) (McKinney 1963).
148 E.g., N.Y. Cnv. PRAC. LAw § 213(1) (McKinney 1963). For the defense of laches, see
Feldman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 123, 18 N.Y.S2d 285 (Ist Dep't 1940);
3 J. POMMEOY, supra note 86, § 917; 4 id. § 1095b.
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concurred in the distribution of corporate assets to shareholders without
adequate provision for all known debts, obligations, and liabilities of
the corporation, shall be jointly and severally liable to the corpora-
tion 149 for the value of such distributed assets, to the extent that the
debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation are not thereafter
paid and discharged.150 Actions for such liabilities sometimes are subject
to special statutes of limitations.' 5 '
Under such statutory formulations, directors would be personally
liable, to the extent of the distributed corporate assets, for known
pre-dissolution claims but not for unknown pre-dissolution claims.
"Known" liabilities might include those which, by the exercise of due
care, should have been known to the directors.152 A director would not
be liable if, in the circumstances, he discharged his duties in good faith
and with due care.153
Any director against whom such a claim is asserted is entitled to
contribution from his fellow directors who voted for or concurred in
the distribution, 54 from the shareholders who received such assets,
knowing the distribution to have been wrongful, 55 and possibly from
recipient shareholders without such knowledge 5 5
An occasional statute authorizes actions against directors or officers
for wrongful transfers of corporate assets. 57 Such a statute probably
does not add much to the liabilities of directors but does expand the
group with standing to sue by providing that actions against directors
might be maintained by the corporation, a receiver, trustee in bank-
ruptcy, officer, director, judgment creditor, or shareholder. 58
149 E.g., MODEL ACr § 48(c); cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719(a) (McKinney 1963) (direc-
tors liable to the corporation for the benefit of its creditors or shareholders, to the extent
of any injury suffered by such persons as a result of such action). New York provides that
an action for such relief may be brought by, among others, a judgment creditor or by a
shareholder suing derivatively. Id. § 720(b). The statutory liability of directors could be
construed as a procedural device to facilitate recovery by claimants against the relatively
small number of directors. While shareholder liability is predicated on directorial liability
by these statutes, the liability of the recipient shareholders should not be limited to this
mode of recovery. See note 162 infra.
150 E.g., MODEL Acr § 48(c); N.Y. Bus. COR'. LAw § 719(a)(3) (McKinney 1963). The
Model Act in § 48 does not make explicit reference to its barring provision, § 105. New
York coordinates the two provisions by incorporating the effect of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1007(a) (McKinney 1963) in id. § 719(a)(3).
151 E.g., N.Y. Crv. PitAc. LAw §§ 213(1), (8) (McKinney 1963).
152 See Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 451, 76 Mont. Co. L. Rep.
296 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 197-99 infra.
153 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 717, 719(e) (McKinney 1963).
154 E.g., MODEL Act § 48(c); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719(c) (McKinney 1963).
155 E.g., MODEL AcT § 48(c).
156 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 719(d)(3) (McKinney 1963).
'57 E.g., id. § 720(a). See APPENDix B infra.
'58 N.Y. Bus. Co"P. LAw § 720(b) (McKinney 1963).
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Many statutes expressly provide that the liabilities thereunder are
in addition to any other liabilities imposed by law upon directors5 9 or
that such provisions shall not affect any liability otherwise imposed by
law upon any director.160 Under statutes with or without such a pro-
vision, the extent of the liabilities of directors under common law and
equitable principles has received little judicial attention. Even if the
degree of liability would be the same under such principles and under
the corporate statute, the statutory liability is often to the corporation,
and possibly to judgment creditors of the corporation, but not neces-
sarily to other claimants, such as creditors with unliquidated claims, as
is the case under the "trust fund theory."
4. Liabilities of Recipient Shareholders for Pre-Dissolution
Claims
Pre-dissolution claims that have been barred against the corpora-
tion would similarly be barred against the shareholders. In the absence
of such a bar, however, shareholders receiving liquidation distributions
might be liable to pre-dissolution claimants. Obviously, each sharehold-
er's liability would not exceed the value of the corporate assets re-
ceived by him.
Under the "trust fund theory," recipient shareholders would hold
any liquidation distributions in trust for corporate creditors. Claimants,
even with unliquidated claims, would have standing to sue, absent
laches or any applicable statutes of limitations.' 6 ' Corporate statutes
have supplemented but not necessarily replaced the "trust fund
theory."162
159 E.g., MODEL Acr § 48.
160 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw §§ 719(f), 720(c) (McKinney 1963).
161 See Updike v. United States, 8 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1925), wherein the court clearly
outlines this theory:
Ihe assets of a dissolved corporation may be followed as in the nature of a trust
fund into the hands of stockholders, and . . . where the debt was not judicially
established by action against the corporation before its dissolution, it may be pre-
sented and its validity determined in the equitable suit to enforce such liability of
the stockholders.
Id. at 917. Accord, McWilliams v. Excelsior Coal Co., 298 F. 884, 887-88 (t Cir. 1924); see
note 144 supra; notes 162 & 207 infra.
162 G. GLENN, supra note 79, § 250. While Glenn disagreed with the "trust fund
theory," he drew on the reasoning of Updike and concluded that equity would allow an
unliquidated creditor to pursue corporate assets into the hands of transferee shareholdeis.
Id.
Under the Model Act, unknown claimants still require the protection of the "trust
fund theory." Known claimants are adequately protected by the provision for mailed
notice of dissolution and by the statutory liabilities of distributing directors and
recipient shareholders for distributions made without payment or adequate provision for
known claims. Unknown claimants can sue the corporation during the two-year post-
dissolution period, but at that time the corporation would have no assets. Thus, without
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Under modern statutory formulations, recipient shareholders are
liable if they receive liquidation distributions made without adequate
provision for "known" corporate liabilities.163 Their liabilities, under
such statutes, are dependent upon the distributing directors either
having been found liable to the corporation 4 or having paid such
liabilities.165 Such directors may be entitled to contribution from re-
cipient shareholders166 as well as from concurring directors.167 The
Model Act limits the directors' rights of contribution against recipient
shareholders to those who received assets knowing such distribution to
have been improper'68 and also provides that any liabilities of recipient
shareholders should be in proportion to the amounts they received.169
In New York, the directors are subrogated to the "rights of the
corporation" against the shareholders who received an improper dis-
tribution of assets.' 70 Such "rights of the corporation" are not defined,
but the statute apparently assumes that a dissolved corporation, at
least for the benefit of its creditors and shareholders, can recover im-
proper liquidation distributions from recipient shareholders. 17' Special
statutes of limitations sometimes apply. 72
the "trust fund theory," an unknown claimant would be remediless. Section 48 of the
Model Act, which is limited in scope and expressly non-preemptive, does not preclude
this result, since it imposes additional liability only on directors who disregard known
claims and recognizes their possible right to contribution from recipient shareholders
who knew of the impropriety of the distribution.
The New York statute has rendered resort to the "trust fund theory" less necessary.
Claimants, upon written or published notice from the corporation, are entitled to file and
have their claims satisfied out of corporate assets before they are distributed to share-
holders. If distributing directors fail to provide for filed claims, they would be liable to
the corporation, and, if they pay the claim, they would be subrogated to the rights of
the corporation against recipient shareholders. If the directors fail to pay the claim, how-
ever, the statutory remedy seems to be incomplete, and the claimant should be able either
to enforce the rights of the corporation against the recipient shareholders or to proceed
against them under the "trust fund theory."
163 E.g., MODEL Acr § 48(c); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 719(a)(3), (d)(1) (McKinney
1963).
164 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CopR. LAw § 719(d)(3) (McKinney 1963).
165 E.g., MODEL Acr § 48(c).
166 E.g., id.; N.Y. Bus. Coa'. LAw § 719(d)(3) (McKinney 1963).
167 E-g., MODE.L Aar § 48(c); N.Y. Bus. CoR'. LAw § 719(c) (McKinney 1963).
168 MODEL Act § 48(c).
169 Id.
170 N.Y. Bus. CoRP'. LAiw § 719(d)(3) (McKinney 1963).
171 The theory of this recovery is expressed as follows:
The unlawful transfer of corporate assets, besides being a violation of law,
operates to the damage of the corporation, and, to the extent that it depletes
corporate assets available to creditors for the satisfaction of their claims, operates
to their damage.
New York Joint Legislative Committee To Study Revision of Corporation Laws, Research
Release No. 44, June 3, 1958, at 130.
172 E.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW §§ 213(l), (8) (McKinney 1963).
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Where a liquidation distribution constitutes a conveyance fraudu-
lent as to someone with a pre-dissolution claim, such a claimant might
be able to recover the corporate assets from the recipient shareholder.173
C. Liabilities For Post-Dissolution "Claims"
The lawyers who formulated corporate statutory revisions failed
to appreciate the increasing compassion of sales law codifiers and torts
re-restaters for persons injured by products and largely ignored post-
dissolution "claims." The comprehensive coverage of pre-dissolution
claims by corporate statutes supports the possibility that common law
and equitable principles thereby might be preempted. In contrast, the
statutory application to post-dissolution claims is so tenuous as to make
it more probable that common law and equitable principles apply to
the extent they are not inconsistent with the statute.
173 Recipient shareholders, of course, give no consideration, much less fair considera-
tion, for the corporate assets distributed to them (other than their right to share in the
"net assets'). Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, adopted in 25 jurisdictions,
recipient shareholders are subject to the claims of a creditor. The latter is defined as a
person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated,
absolute, fixed, or contingent. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 1, 9B UNIFORM LAws
ANN. 73 (1966); Federal Bankruptcy Act § 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1964). See United
States v. 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating "con-
veyances are fraudulent as to present and future creditors, even if the transferor was
solvent at the time of the transfers, if the transferor was left with 'unreasonably small
capital' or if he 'intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as
they mature'"); Ashbaugh v. Saner, 268 Mich. 467, 256 N.W. 486 (1934) (holding tort
claimant to be "creditor" from date of tort); Horan v. John F. Trommer, Inc., 129
N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct., af'd mem., 283 App. Div. 774, 128 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1st Dep't
1954) (distributing directors-recipient shareholders held liable to creditor of dissolved
corporation to extent of corporate assets received by them).
Professor Glenn, in his treatise on fraudulent conveyances, concludes that an improper
distribution to shareholders should not be treated as a fraudulent conveyance, but rather
the remedy should be through the corporate statutory scheme. 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 604 (rev. ed. 1940).
New York, until 1963, had an awkwardly drafted corporate statutory provision making
distributing directors and recipient shareholders liable to creditors, among others, for
the transfer of corporate funds in violation thereof. Former N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw § 15
(McKinney 1951). This statute was characterized as "even more stringent" than the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act with respect to conveyances to officers, directors, or
shareholders. United States v. 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475, 499 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). The 1963 revisers omitted § 15 from the new Business Corporation Law "as
superfluous since the subject matter is adequately covered in the Debtor and Creditor
Law and in the Bankruptcy Act [Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act]." N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAw, § 719, at 720 (McKinney 1963). See Warren, supra note 83, at 545-46:
If the corporation had been a going concern, such a transfer of assets to stock-
holders would have been objectionable as a fraudulent conveyance. Very likely the
bank was rendered immediately insolvent by the transfer, but, even if it were not,
the transfer, under the law as it then was, would have been fraudulent as against
existing creditors if ultimately the bank became insolvent.
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The term post-dissolution "claims" is used in preference to post-
dissolution "liabilities" to avoid any implication that such claims can
be asserted against a dissolved corporation, its assets, directors, or
shareholders. Whether or not they can, and, if so, against whom, to
what extent, under what circumstances, and subject to what time
limitations, are the principal questions now to be considered.
Post-dissolution "claims" include those which arise upon physical
injury after dissolution under the negligence theory, or under the
strict liability theory when analogized to negligence. Claims under the
breach of warranty theory, or under the strict liability theory when
analogized to breach of warranty, accrue upon tender of delivery of the
goods. Since such tender presumably occurs while the corporation is
doing business prior to dissolution, the likelihood of post-dissolution
"claims" under this theory is minimal.174
Depending upon the language of the applicable corporate statute,
potential liabilities for post-dissolution "claims," as for pre-dissolution
claims, might exist against
(1) the participating corporate personnel;
(2) the dissolved corporation;
(3) the directors responsible for the distribution of the corpora-
tion's "net assets" to shareholders; and
(4) the shareholders who received such assets.
1. Liabilities of Participating Corporate Personnel for Post-Disso-
lution "Claims"
Participating corporate officers or other employees responsible for
any post-dissolution "claims," regardless of other possible liabilities in
their capacities as directors or shareholders, would be liable from the
time the cause of action accrued. Such liability would not be affected
by corporate dissolution, but would be subject to applicable statutes
of limitations.
174 Any claim arising out of the carrying on of business by the dissolved corporation
should be enforceable by or against the corporation under statutes precluding the defense
of ultra vires, under the de facto doctrine, or under principles of estoppel. MODEL Aar
§ 7. See Garzo v. Maid of the Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516, 524, 104 N.E.2d 882, 887
(1952); Wilkins v. Sirael Realty Corp., 174 Misc. 1002, 21 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1940); 4
I. KANTROwrrz & S. SLTrrsKy, WHITE ON NEv YORK CORPORATIONS 1006.08[3] (13th ed.
1966). See also Seavy v. I.X.L. Laundry Co., 60 Nev. 324, 108 P.2d 853 (1941) (dissolved Ne-
vada corporation and shareholders held suable for post-dissolution claim under statute pro-
viding that dissolved corporation continues for purpose of suing and being sued where
shareholders continued to carry on business). Most post-dissolution claims arise from the
improper continuation of business during the winding up period, in contrast with most
post-dissolution products liability claims which, arise thereafter.
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2. Liabilities of Dissolved Corporation for Post-Dissolution
"Claims"
Post-dissolution "claims" can arise against a dissolved corporation
only to the extent that the corporate statute continues it in existence
for the purpose of being sued. Judicial construction of such statutes is
rare. Traditional canons of construction lead to contradictory results:
statutes extending post-dissolution corporate existence, being in dero-
gation of the common law, should be strictly construed; 175 to the extent
that they are remedial, they should be liberally construed.17 6
Few corporate statutes deal expressly with post-dissolution
"claims" against the corporation.17 7 Most of the statutes contain lan-
guage to the effect that the corporation may do all acts required to
liquidate the business; some of the statutes specify that for the purpose
of winding up the corporation may sue and be sued. 78
Other statutes provide that dissolved corporations shall continue
for the purpose of suing and being sued, with or without time limita-
tions. 179 Like the Model Act, many statutes provide that corporate
existence shall continue until "dissolution," at which time corporate
existence shall cease, "except for the purposes of suits."' 80
The Model Act and numerous other statutes expressly provide for
the survival of pending actions and existing claims by or against the
corporation, permitting actions on such claims within two years after
dissolution. Obviously, post-dissolution "claims," which by definition
do not exist at the time of dissolution, can hardly "survive." Provision
175 See text accompanying note 199 infra.
176 See text accompanying note 189 infra. See also Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293
F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968).
177 See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra. Only one paragraph in Fletcher's work
on private corporations deals with post-dissolution claims.
Under certain circumstances a corporation may become liable for torts
committed after its dissolution, as where a de facto existence continues the cor-
poration so as to carry with it a liability then accruing. Ordinarily, however, a
corporation has not even a de facto existence after the expiration of its charter,
and where this is the case, such a liability does not arise. The remedy would be
against the individuals committing the wrong.
16A W. FLETcHER, CycLoPEDiA OF THE LAw oF PRIVAE COR'ORATIONS § 8141 (rev. vol.
1962) (footnotes omitted).
178 See text accompanying notes 90 & 116-17 supra.
179 See note 130 supra. Under such a formulation, post-dissolution claims should be
assertable against the corporation within any time limitation and possibly against dis-
tributing directors or recipient shareholders even after such period, since the limitation
is on corporate existence rather than on claims.
180 Such a formulation, if construed as a limitation on corporate existence rather than
on claims, would preclude the assertion of post-dissolution claims against the dissolved
corporation (Christensen v. Boss, 179 Neb. 429, 138 N.W.2d 716 (1.965)) but not necessarily
against distributing directors or recipient shareholders. Cf. note 196 infra.
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for the "survival" of post-dissolution "claims" not in existence at the
time of dissolution would be a contradiction in terms.
a. Under Model Business Corporation Act. The Model Act ex-
pressly permits actions by or against a dissolved corporation on pre-
dissolution claims if commenced within two years after such dissolu-
tion. 81 The existence of the corporation ceases upon the issuance of
the certificate of dissolution, except for the purposes of suits as provided
in the Act.18 2 The only explicit provision in the Act for suits by or
against a dissolved corporation'8 3 is section 105 providing for the
survival of remedies for pre-dissolution claims if action thereon is com-
menced within two years after the date of dissolution. A literal reading
of the Model Act would preclude the assertion against the corporation
of post-dissolution "claims" whether they arise during the two-year
period'8 4 or thereafter.8 5
Only three reported cases--two in lower federal courts and one in
a Pennsylvania county court-have been found discussing the suability,
under the Model Act formulation, of a dissolved corporation on a post-
dissolution claim. In Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co.,8 6 decided
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, a
dissolved Ohio corporation was sued for negligence in the manufacture
and sale of an incubator and for breach of warranty. The Ohio corpo-
rate statute expressly provided, like the Model Act, that any claim
existing or, unlike the Model Act, which would have accrued, against
a dissolved corporation might be prosecuted.8 7 The question of
181 MODEL Acr § 105.
182 Id. § 93. In contrast, New York provides that the dissolved corporation shall
function for purposes of winding up, including suits, as if dissolution had not taken
place, except as otherwise provided therein or by court order. See text accompanying
notes 97 & 117 supra.
183 For oblique references to suits by or against corporations in dissolution, see
MODEL Acr §§ 92(e), 93, 98.
184 Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Iowa 1968), discussed in
text accompanying notes 191-99 infra. See also notes 97 & 182 supra.
185 On the theory that the two-year period is a limitation on claims, see note 196
infra. The contrary argument would be that corporate existence ends upon the issuance
of the certificate of dissolution, except for suability on pre-dissolution claims within the
next two years and on post-dissolution claims without such two-year limitation. Under
the latter construction, post-dissolution claims, whether arising during or after the two-
year period, could be asserted against distributing directors and recipient shareholders.
See notes 97 & 182 supra.
180 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
s187 Omo Rrv. CODE ANN. § 1701.88 (Page 1964):
(A) When a corporation is dissolved... the corporation shall cease to carry
on business and shall do only such acts as are required to wind up its affairs,
but for such purpose it shall continue as a corporation.(B) Any claim existing or action or proceeding pending by or against the
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whether an action could be maintained against the dissolved corpora-
tion on a cause of action which accrued after the date of dissolution
was found to be one of first impression.188 Adopting the principle that
statutes extending the vitality of a dissolved corporation for purposes
of suit are remedial in nature and should be given a liberal construc-
tion,189 the court held that the Ohio statute permitted a dissolved
corporation to be sued on a post-dissolution claim. Distinguishing the
Ohio statute from those based on the Model Act, the court stated by
way of dictum:
The Court has reviewed the statutes of several states treating
on this matter of the continued existence of a dissolved corporation
for purposes of litigation, and finds that there is a wide range of
phraseology therein. Many of the said statutes, however, bear a
strong resemblance to section 98 [renumbered section 105 in 1969]
of the Model Business Corporation Act. Section 98 [105], in its
pertinent part, provides that dissolution of a corporation shall not
take away or impair any remedy available against such corporation
for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to
dissolution. It is, therefore, quite clear that under the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, and those state statutes patterned after it,
a corporation may be sued for pre-dissolution torts only.390
The later federal case, Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co.,191 involved
an Iowa corporate statute which, like the Model Act, provided for the
survival of remedies against a dissolved corporation for any claim
existing prior to dissolution if action thereon was commenced within
two years after the date of dissolution.1 2 The Iowa corporation had
corporation or which would have accrued against it may be prosecuted to judg-
ment, with right of appeal as in other cases ....
Id.
188 239 F. Supp. at 251.
189 Id.
190 Id. (emphasis added). The court construed the statute as follows:
It is this Court's opinion that the intent of O.R.C. § 1701.88(B) is as follows:
"Any claim existing [not yet sued upon] or action or proceeding [already
commenced] pending by or against the [dissolved] corporation or [any claim
not yet sued upon or action or proceeding] which would have accrued
against it [had dissolution not occurred] may be prosecuted to judgment,
with right of appeal as in other cases .... "
Under this Court's construction of the Ohio statute, plaintiff's claim may be
brought against Gordon Armstrong Company, Inc. at this time. The inclusion of
"any claim" imposes a broader liability than merely for liabilities incurred as a
part of the winding up process, which construction is urged on behalf of defen-
dant.
id. (brackets in original).
191 293 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Iowa 1968).
192 IowA CODE § 496A.102 (1966).
Its pertinent provisions, substantially identical to § 105 of the Model Act, are
The dissolution of a corporation . . . shall not take away or impair any
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been dissolved in 1964; personal injuries were allegedly suffered in
1965, a year and a half after dissolution; and the action for breach of
warranty and negligent manufacture of a truck crane was commenced
in 1967, three and one-half years after dissolution. The defense was
that the action was not commenced within the two-year survival period
as required by the Iowa statute. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa, finding no Iowa authorities after ex-
haustive research, quoted the dictum from the Chadwick case to the
effect that, under the Model Act formulation, a dissolved corporation
"may be sued for pre-dissolution torts only."193 The court held that the
action on the post-dissolution claim, having commenced more than
three and one-half years after dissolution, was barred under the Iowa
statute. The basis for the holding is ambiguous, however. One possi-
bility indicated by the court's quotation of the Chadwick dictum is
that a dissolved corporation may be sued only for pre-dissolution
claims. On the other hand, the court also seemed to apply the two-year
limitation on any action "thereon" to bar the post-dissolution claim. 194
The latter rationale implies that post-dissolution claims might be
allowed if brought within the two-year period even though this limita-
tion literally applies only to pre-dissolution claims.
remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers, or share-
holders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such
dissolution ... if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two
years after the date of such dissolution ....
Id. The Iowa legislature supplemented the Model Act provision by adding:
A corporation which has been dissolved or the period of duration of which
has expired by limitation or otherwise, may nevertheless continue to act for the
purpose of conveying title to its property, real and personal, and otherwise
winding up its affairs.
Id.
193 293 F. Supp. at 95.
194 Id. at 96.
Plaintiff urges that the added language "otherwise winding up its affairs,"
includes the defending of actions brought against the corporation. The court is
of the view that the Supreme Court of Iowa would not adopt plaintiff's position.
Statutes relative to litigation against a dissolved corporation are liberally con-
strued. . . . In the first paragraph of the Iowa statute specific language was
provided relative to the problem of the survival of rights or claims against dis-
solved corporations. . . . In the light of such specific reference it seems highly
untenable that the legislative intent manifest in the inclusion of the last para-
graph was such as to allow indefinite continued subjection of the corporation and
its officers and directors to litigation. The policies inherent in the dissolution and
winding up the affairs of a corporation all dictate to the contrary. ... There
should be a definite point in time at which the existence of a corporation and
the transaction of its business are terminated. To allow, as the plaintiff contends,
the continued prosecution of lawsuits perverts the definiteness and orderly
process of dissolution so as to produce a continuous dribble of business activity
contrary to the intent of the winding up provisions of the statute.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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A literal reading of the Model Act, the dictum in the Chadwick
case, and the holding in the Bishop case indicate that a dissolved corpo-
ration cannot be sued on post-dissolution claims, with the possible
exception of post-dissolution claims arising during the two-year period
following dissolution if suit is commenced within such two-year pe-
riod. 95 The Wisconsin survival provision, patterned after the Model
Act, has been interpreted as precluding all claims against the dissolved
corporation after the two-year period.196
In the Pennsylvania case, 97 suit was brought against the former
officers, directors, and shareholders of a dissolved Pennsylvania corpo-
ration. The corporation, when selling property prior to its dissolution,
had agreed to assume responsibility for collecting improvement costs
chargeable against certain named persons, but underwent voluntary or
nonjudicial dissolution prior to the time when the improvements were
made. The Pennsylvania corporation statute had a "survival of remedy
for preexisting claims" provision 98 like the Model Act.
The court stated, obiter dictum, that the dissolved corporation,
which was not a party to the action, was not suable on a post-dissolution
claim under the Pennsylvania provision, adding that such provision was
in derogation of the common law' 99 and implying that it should be
strictly construed. The court observed that a remedy for a nonexistent
claim could hardly be preserved.
b. Under New York Business Corporation Law. Under the New
York Business Corporation Law, in contrast to the Model Act, dissolu-
tion occurs at the first stage, upon the filing of the "certificate of dis-
solution," prior to winding up. New York, like the Model Act, has a
"survival of remedy for pre-dissolution claims" provision. It also has a
195 See text accompanying note 184 supra.
196 Wis. STAT. § 180.787 (Supp. 1970); See Young, Some Comments on the New Wis-
consin Business Corporation Law, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 5, wherein the author concludes that
while the dissolution of a corporation shall not destroy any remedy available
either to or against the corporation, suit must be started on the claim within two
years. The limitation, thus, is not on the corporation's existence, but on the
cause of action.
Id. at 15. This interpretation, it has been stated, similarly applies to shareholders and
directors and limits remedies against them to two years after dissolution. Tyrrell, Intro-
duction to the Business Corporation Law, 22 Wis. STAT. ANN. xXV, xxxv (1957). See also
Security Nat'l Bank v. Cohen, 31 Wis. 2d 656, 143 N.W.2d 454 (1966); Sthoone, supra note
79; notes 110 & 180 supra.
197 Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 281, 75 Mont. Co. L. Rep.
255 (1958).
198 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2111 (1967).
199 Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d at 283, 75 Mont. Co. L. Rep.
at 256.
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limited post-dissolution period for the assertion of claims-six months
for the filing of claims as compared with the Model Act's two-year
period for commencing actions. In contrast to the Model Act, New
York's "suability of dissolved corporation" and "filing and barring of
claims" provisions are not expressly limited to pre-dissolution claims.
Under the New York statute, the suability of a dissolved corpora-
tion for post-dissolution claims, especially those arising after the six-
month period, is an unresolved question. The basic statutory premise
is that a dissolved corporation shall function for purposes of winding
up, including suing and being sued, in the same manner as if dissolu-
tion had not taken place, except as otherwise provided in the statute or
by court order. The only relevant statutory provisions are those for
the survival of pre-dissolution claims and for the barring of claims not
timely filed.200
200 New York Joint Legislative Committee To Study Revision of Corporation Laws,
Research Release No. 89, Oct. 1, 1958, recommended, inter alia, the survival of a remedy
"for any liability incurred prior to such dissolution, if suit is brought and service of
process had within three years from the date of such dissolution." Id. at 2. Among the
several survival statutes described were § 98 of the Model Act (now § 105) and statutes
based on it and the Ohio statute, but without any reference to post-dissolution or even
contingent claims. Verbatim statutory texts of the Model Act, the then New York
General Corporation Law, and 10 other jurisdictions, including Ohio, were quoted with-
out specific mention of the latter's inclusion of the phrase "or which would have
accrued against it" (Omo Rzv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.88(B) (Page 1964)). The consultant recom-
mended that the proposed New York Business Corporation Law make explicit that
dissolution does not impair any remedy arising from any liability "prior to the dissolution"
(Research Release No. 89, supra at 12-13), concluding that "[i]n providing for the survival
of a remedy after dissolution, policy is best served by making the most explicit provisions
to cope with particular problems that might arise in the winding up period in their
absence." Id. at 14. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §§ 1005(a)(1), 1006(a), 1009 (McKinney 1963).
See also note 117 supra.
If the claim arises under a contract entered into prior to dissolution, it should
clearly be enforceable. Similarly, if it arises out of a transaction appropriate for
the winding-up of the corporation's affairs, there should be no objection to en-
forcing it either on behalf of or against the corporation.
4 I. KANTIowz 9- S. SLUTSKY, supra note 174 (footnotes omitted).
Meager case authority exists on this point. In City of New York v. New York &
S.B. Ferry & Steam Transp. Co., 104 Misc. 438, 172 N.Y.S. 495 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd mere.,
190 App. Div. 939, 179 N.Y.S. 914 (1st Dep't 1920), rev'd, 231 N.Y. 18, 131 N.E. 554 (1921),
the lower court, in construing and rejecting a claim based on a breach of a covenant
against encumbrances, gave an excellent analysis of the post-dissolution problem. In re-
versing, Judge Cardozo felt that such a covenant was a contingent claim, pre-dissolution
in nature, and allowable. He did not take issue with the dissolution discussion itself and
in fact stated: "Dissolution or bankruptcy, does, indeed, draw a dividing line as the
result of accidents of time between claims capable of being proved, and those required to
be rejected." 231 N.Y. at 24, 181 N.E. at 556.
In Commissioners of the State Ins. Fund v. H.L. & F. McBride, Inc., 195 Misc. 362,
90 N.YS.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1949), the court allowed a claim based on a pre-dissolution
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The New York statute provides that for the purpose of winding
up the affairs of a dissolved corporation, it may be sued as if dissolution
had not taken place.201 No New York cases have been found definitively
construing this provision. Three conclusions are possible as to the
claims on which the dissolved corporation continues to be suable:
(1) only pre-dissolution claims; (2) pre-dissolution claims and only
those post-dissolution claims arising prior to the end of the six-month
period; or (3) all post-dissolution claims as well as pre-dissolution
claims. Arguably, since the 1963 elimination of the third stage of
"termination," 202 a dissolved corporation continues "in limbo" and
remains suable until winding up is completed, and winding up is not
completed until all claims, whether pre- or post-dissolution, have been
satisfied. If this, the broadest of the three possible constructions, is
followed, the dissolved corporation would be liable on post-dissolution
claims, subject possibly to the "barring of claims" provision and, in any
event, to applicable statutes of limitations.
The New York statute also provides that claims that are barred
after the six-month period expressly include "unliquidated or contin-
gent claims" and those of claimants "with whom the corporation has
unfulfilled contracts." 203 Again, no cases have been found deciding
whether post-dissolution claims, whether or not arising prior to the
end of the six-month period, are subject to this "filing and barring of
claims" provision. To the extent that they are, post-dissolution claims
that are not so filed would be forever barred at the end of the six-month
period against the dissolved corporation, its assets, directors, officers,
and shareholders, except where the court allows tardily filed claims.
Since the claims subject to this provision include "unliquidated
or contingent claims" and those of claimants "with whom the corpora-
tion has unfulfilled contracts,"2  post-dissolution claims, if they fit such
accident to be asserted against the corporation. A subsidiary claim which did not accrue
until after dissolution, however, was held to be barred.
Sanitary Brass Works, Inc. v. Rubin & Marcus, Inc., 110 Misc. 565, 566, 180 N.Y.S.
619 (County Ct. 1920), implies that if his claim did not accrue prior to dissolution,
plaintiff might bring his action against the directors as trustees of the dissolved corpora-
tion's assets. Since directors are no longer trustees in New York, the validity of this
dictum has become even more questionable.
See also Cunningham v. Glauber, 133 App. Div. 10, 117 N.Y.S. 866 (Ist Dep't 1909);
Wilkins v. Sirael Realty Corp., 174 Misc. 1002, 1003, 21 N.Y.&2d 1017, 1018 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Douglas v. Perlstein, 170 Misc. 561, 563, 10 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
201 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1006(a)(4) (McKinney 1963).
202 See note 112 supra.
203 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1007(a) (McKinney 1963).
204 Bernard Semel, Inc. v. Fleishaker (Sup. Ct. 1970), in N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1970, at
18, col. 5, discussed in note 122 supra.
Section 1007(a) is broader than § 1006 in its reference to "all creditors and claimants,
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description, would be subject to the filing requirements. The claims
would thus be barred after the six-month period despite the anomalous
result that such a construction would require filing by a person whose
claim has not yet arisen, and would therefore bar a non-existent
claim.205 However, this harsh result might be avoided by court allow-
ance, for a satisfactory reason, of tardily filed claims against "any
remaining assets of the corporation." That the claim had not arisen
prior to the end of (or possibly even during) the six-month period
should be a satisfactory reason for tardy filing and the allowing of
such claim as one junior to the allowed claims filed during the six-
month period.206 The phrase "any remaining assets of the corporation"
clearly includes corporate assets still in the possession of the dissolved
corporation after provision for all allowed claims filed during the six-
month period, and arguably, includes corporate assets distributed to
shareholders.
including any with unliquidated or contingent claims and any with whom the corporation
has unfulfilled contracts." N.Y. Bus. CORP. L.v § 1007(a) (McKinney 1963) (emphasis added).
Posing problems are (1) the drafting of the text of the notice to such "creditors and
claimants" and (2) the "due diligence" required to ascertain the names and addresses of
persons believed to be creditors of or claimants against the corporation. Id.
The Legislative Studies and Reports to § 1007 includes the comment that, "'u]n-
liquidated and contingent claims' have been included with those that will be barred
if not presented within six months." Id. § 1007 (Legislative Studies and Reports).
In contrast, the Model Act uses only the phrase "any right or claim existing, or
any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution ... " MODEL Acr § 105.
The Court of Appeals in In re Lexington Sur. & Indem. Co., 272 N.Y. 210, 5 N.E.2d
204 (1936), which involved a claim on post-dissolution default under a pre-dissolution
surety bond, defined a "contingent" claim or liability as:
"A claim which may never accrue; one which has not accrued and which is de-
pendent on the happening of some future event; one that depends for its effect
on some future event, which may or may not happen." . . Also contingent
liability....
This court has repeatedly referred to surety bonds as contingent prior to
default.
Id. at 214, 5 N.E.2d at 205, quoting 13 CJ. Contingent Claim 114 (1917).
For unfulfilled contract claims, see Heaney v. Riddle, 343 Pa. 453, 23 A.2d 456
(1942); Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 281, 75 Mont. Co. L. Rep.
255 (1958). See also City of New York v. New York & S.B. Ferry & Steam Transp. Co., 231
N.Y. 18, 131 N.E. 554 (1921), discussed in note 200 supra.
205 Yet, in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.YS.2d 490 (1969), the claim, unless negligence could be proven, was barred before
it arose. See notes 51-58 and accompanying text supra. The rule for malpractice claims,
which accrue upon commission rather than discovery, is similarly harsh. N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LivW § 214(6) (McKinney 1963). See note 32 supra.
206 See Bernard Semel, Inc. v. Fleishaker (Sup. Ct. 1970), in N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1970,
at 18, col. 5 (holding that although plaintiff, suffering damage on August 9, 1965, did not
file a timely claim under N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1006(b) (McKinney 1963) [sic] against
a corporation dissolved on October 2, 1964, plaintiff might nonetheless show a satisfactory
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If a dissolved corporation were suable, a further unresolved ques-
tion would be whether an execution of judgment against it would have
to be returned unsatisfied before the post-dissolution claim could be
asserted against distributing directors or recipient shareholders. 20 7
c. Under Other Corporate Statutes. Under statutes continuing the
existence of a dissolved corporation for the purpose of suing and being
sued, dissolution would not affect the accrual or assertion of post-disso-
lution claims against it while such existence continues.2 08 After the
expiration of such period, if limited in time, post-dissolution claims
might still be asserted against distributing directors and recipient
shareholders, since this limitation is on the existence of the corpora-
tion and not on the claim itself.20 9
3. Liabilities of Distributing Directors for Post-Dissolution
"Claims"
Under the Model Act formulation, assuming full compliance with
dissolution procedures, no claim against the corporation can exist after
the two-year post-dissolution suability period. On this theory, arguably,
distributing directors could not be liable for any physical harm suffered
after such period.210
Under New York law, if the post-dissolution claims are barred, the
bar would protect the directors as well as the corporation itself and
the shareholders.21'
In jurisdictions which merely provide that dissolution shall not
impair existing claims and remedies without time limitation, or which
extend corporate existence for purposes of being sued, or under other
reason for not doing so under id. § 1007(b)-an issue to be determined at trial, therefore
precluding summary judgment).
207 Horan v. John F. Trommer, Inc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 283 App.
Div. 774, 128 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1st Dep't 1954) (holding claimant could establish his debt
and challenge the alleged liquidation distribution within single suit without the necessity
of first securing judgment against corporation where the circumstances justified classifying
the distributions as transfers in fraud of creditors). See notes 144 & 161-62 supra.
208 See notes 130-31 supra.
209 See notes 129 & 196 supra.
210 See note 20 supra. If, before distributing the corporate assets to shareholders and
prior to the filing of the articles of dissolution, the directors paid or made adequate
provision for all corporate liabilities, they would not be liable for post-dissolution claims
thereafter arising during the two-year period. Absent directors' liability, the recipient
shareholder would not be liable. Cf. Heaney v. Riddle, 343 Pa. 453, 458-59, 23 A.2d 456, 459
(1942) (claim arising after dissolution of corporation held not impaired by reason of prior
distribution of assets of corporation if such distribution was not effected in accordance
with law; dictum that if accounting had been made and notice given, distribution of
corporate assets, under decree of court, could then'have been lawfully effected without
any subsequent liability to plaintiff).
211 N.Y. Bus. Core. LAw § 1007(b) (McKinney 1963).
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more explicit statutes providing that dissolution shall not impair
claims, post-dissolution claims against the corporation can accrue. Even
under such statutes, however, it is unlikely that distributing directors
would be liable.
Modem statutes make liable only those directors who authorized
the distribution of corporate assets without making adequate provision
for "known" liabilities.212 Except for post-dissolution "claims" which
might arise during a post-dissolution winding up period, directors
ordinarily would neither know nor have reason to know of post-dissolu-
tion "claims," and hence should not be liable under such statutory
formulations .2 13
Nor sbould the distributing directors be liable under the "trust
fund theory," since they distributed the assets without knowledge or
reasonable cause to know of such "claims. '214 If directors were liable,
however, their liability could not exceed the amount of the improper
distribution, and they might be able to seek contribution from their
fellow distributing directors and recipient shareholders.2 15
212 E.g., MODEL Acr § 48(c); N.Y. Bus. Colp. LAw §§ 719(a)(3), (c) (McKinney 1963);
see text accompanying notes 149-53 supra.
213 See text accompanying notes 151-53 supra.
214 See text accompanying notes 84 & 146-48 supra. In Heaney v. Riddle, 343 Pa.
453, 23 A.2d 456 (1942), the court observed:
Mhe corporation could not dissolve and distribute its assets among its stock-
holders without its liquidating trustees retaining sufficient assets to provide for the
corporate debts, including contingent claims and obligations under executory
contracts .... The assets of a dissolved corporation constitute a trust fund
for creditors and stockholders ... and when defendants, as liquidating trustees,
distributed the assets among themselves as stockholders they made themselves
personally liable, by reason of such breach of their trust, to a creditor whose
right to priority could not be thus destroyed.
Id. at 456, 23 A.2d at 458 (citations omitted). In Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 20 Pa.
D. : C.2d 451, 76 Mont. Co. L. Rep. 296 (1959) (on motion to dismiss amended complaint),
the court stated that the issue was whether the directors as "liquidating trustees" of the
dissolved corporation were required to make provision for the alleged liability owed to
the plaintiff, and that this in turn was dependent on whether or not the plaintiff was
a "known creditor" within the meaning of the corporate statute, so as to require the
directors to give plaintiff notice of dissolution and to provide for the contingent liability.
Id. at 456, 76 Mont. Co. L. Rep. at 300-01. The amended complaint alleged that the
directors knew of the existence of a potential liability to the plaintiff. The court concluded
that these averments were sufficient allegations that the plaintiff was a "known creditor,"
enabling the plaintiff to proceed to trial to prove such contention. This holding and the
earlier holding by the same judge (Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 17 Pa. D. 8- C.2d
281, 75 Mont. Co. L. Rep. 255 (1958); see text accompanying notes 197-99 supra) appear
inconsistent. The earlier holding turned on the finding that the potential contingent
liability, based on a pre-dissolution contract, was not a "liability" incurred prior to
dissolution. In contrast, this subsequent holding was that the claimant was a "known
creditor."
215 See note 86 supra.
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
4. Liabilities of Recipient Shareholders for Post-Dissolution
"Claims"
Recipient shareholders, of course, are not liable unless there is a
valid claim.
The Model Act formulation, assuming full compliance with disso-
lution procedures, precludes the existence of any claim against the
corporation after the post-dissolution two-year suability period. Argu-
ably, the Act would also preclude the assertion of claims against recipi-
ent shareholders for physical harm occurring after, and possibly during,
such period.216
In New York, if post-dissolution "claims" are barred by the cor-
porate statute, this bar expressly protects the shareholders, as well as
the corporation itself and the directors.217 Otherwise, recipient share-
holders, to the extent of corporate assets received, but not necessarily
in proportion to the amounts received, might be personally liable.
In jurisdictions providing that dissolution will not impair existing
claims and remedies, extending corporate existence for purposes of
being sued, or expressly recognizing post-dissolution "claims" against
the corporation, recipient shareholders would face potential liability.
Modem corporate statutes make recipient shareholders liable to
the distributing directors who fail to make adequate provision for
"known" liabilities of the dissolved corporation.218 Only in a rare case
of directorial liability would shareholders be subject to such statutory
liability-at least where the corporate assets were received with knowl-
edge of the impropriety of the distribution, and possibly only to the
extent of the amounts they received.219 The statutory emphasis on
"known" liabilities suggests an intention to encompass only pre-dissolu-
tion claims against recipient shareholders, leaving open the question
of the extent to which the corporate assets received by them would still
be subject to post-dissolution "claims."
No case has been found in which a liquidation distribution to a
shareholder was set aside on the ground that it constituted a convey-
ance fraudulent as to a future claimant. 220
210 See text accompanying notes 149-56, 196 & 210-11 supra.
217 N.Y. Bus. CoaP. LAw § 1007(a) (McKinney 1963); see text accompanying notes
203-07 supra.
218 See text accompanying notes 163-65 supra.
219 See notes 168-69 supra.
220 See note 173 supra. See also Menconi v. Davison, 80 Ill. App. 2d 1, 225 N.E.2d
139 (1967) (dictum that one who becomes creditor subsequent to transfer of assets may
reach those assets only on proof of actual fraud). The contention that corporate statutes
control is less persuasive with reference to post-dissolution claims, concerning which the
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The critical liabilities of recipient shareholders for post-dissolution
"claims" are those which might exist apart from corporate statutes
that do not preclude such liabilities. 221 The "trust fund theory" has
been applied for over a century to satisfy pre-dissolution claims out of
the distributions of the "net assets" of dissolved corporations made to
shareholders, whether or not such shareholders knew or had reason to
know of such claims. No reason appears why the "trust fund theory,"
absent legislation to the contrary, should not be applicable to protect
persons injured by defective products after dissolution or the end of
any post-dissolution "suability of dissolved corporation" period.222
D. Judicial Dissolution Immunities
Judicial dissolution can result in greater immunity from claims
against the dissolved corporation or its directors or shareholders. Such
dissolution is not limited to involuntary proceedings but can occur in
voluntary or nonjudicial dissolution in which judicial supervision of
liquidation is sought.
Under the Model Act, the court may require the filing of claims
within designated time limitations, may prescribe the form of notice to
be given claimants, and may bar claimants who fail to file on time.
corporate statutes are mainly silent, than with reference to pre-dissolution claims, the
statutory treatment of which is relatively complete.
221 See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
222 A future claimant, arguably, is never a creditor of the dissolved corporation. This
conceptual hurdle, however, might not prevent the application of the "trust fund theory"
in favor of future creditors. See note 161 supra.
Equity ameliorated the harsh consequences of dissolution at common law by enabling
the creditor to trace corporate assets. In Pine Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 17 Pa. D.
& C.2d 281, 75 Mont. Co. L. Rep. 255 (1958), the court stated:
Plaintiff's remedy, if any [on a claim maturing after dissolution under a pre-
dissolution contract], is under the common law, against directors for an improper
distribution of assets in dissolution by failing to provide for creditors or against
shareholders for receiving assets which should have been preserved for creditors.
Id. at 284, 75 Mont. Co. L. Rep. at 257. The uncertainty expressed in the Pine Manor
case derives from modern statutes that have codified the "trust fund theory" to some
extent, but do not deal expressly with post-dissolution claims.
In the absence of definitive statutory coverage, this philosophy could well be extended
to fill the equity gap created by dissolution today. A corporation could conceivably mass
produce a defective product until the market declines and then dissolve, leaving a
multitude of potential claims in its wake.
Equity, with its progressive view, could provide the means whereby a post-dissolution
claimant could prevent the immunization of corporate assets even after they had been
lawfully transferred in accordance with dissolution procedures. Such a utilization of equity
is in harmony with its former task of bringing formative corporation law up to date.
Moreover, it certainly would not collide with the current trend of products liability,
which places the burden of injury on as wide a spectrum of society as possible.
Dissolution can offer no sound reason, other than finality, why it should disrupt this
policy. In the absence of a sound legislative solution, equity should provide a remedy.
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Upon the entry or filing of the decree of dissolution, corporate exis-
tence ceases.
In New York, the court has broad powers to make orders concern-
ing adequacy of notice to claimants, recognition and barring of
claims, payment of claims, retention of assets for such purpose, deter-
mination of adequacy of provisions for payment of liabilities (including
possible products liability insurance coverage), disposition or destruc-
tion of corporate records, issuance of injunctions against the commence-
ment or maintenance of suits by creditors, making of liquidation
distributions to shareholders, and payment to the state of any assets dis-
tributable to a creditor or shareholder who is unknown or cannot be
found.
If the statutory dissolution procedures are followed, and there is
full disclosure to the court of any unfulfilled contracts or other con-
tingent claims or potential liabilities, the dissolved corporation and its
directors and shareholders should enjoy the protection of judicial super-
vision.
This procedure is not necessarily hostile to injured consumers.
Since the court is given broad latitude in judicial dissolution or judicial
supervision of liquidation, it might be persuaded to require additional
notice or to prescribe a longer than six-month period for the filing of
claims.
E. Products Liability Insurance Coverage
Products liability insurance coverage can afford substantial pro-
tection to the manufacturing corporation prior to its dissolution.
Under the new standard Comprehensive General Liability Pol-
icy,223 which became effective on October 1, 1966, the insurer's liability
is limited to physical injury that occurs during the policy period;
the dissolution of the insured might terminate the policy. For an injury
occurring after the termination of the policy, even though the product
was sold prior to such termination, there would be no insurance cover-
age.224
For insurance protection against post-dissolution "claims," a policy
would have to be maintained for the period during which claims can
be asserted. This depends on the applicable statutes of limitations and
223 See generally German, The New Comprehensive General Liabilities Policy, in S.
SCreaBER - P. RHEINCOLD, supra note 1, at 7:5; Anderson, Current Problems in Products
Liability Law and Products Liability Insurance, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 436 (1964); Sorensen,
The New Comprehensive General Liability Policy's Product Liability Coverage, 1966 INs.
L.J. 645.
224 See Palardy v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 360 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966); Silver
Eagle Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 246 Ore. 398, 423 P.2d 944 (1967).
[Vol. 56:865
PRODUCTS LIABILITY & DISSOLUTION
their possible tolling during the plaintiff's infancy or other incapac-
ity.225 In addition, the policy should protect not only the dissolved
corporation but also any corporate personnel, directors responsible for
liquidation distributions, and recipient shareholders who might be
liable for post-dissolution "claims."
CONCLUSION
Post-dissolution "claims,' for products liability, to a much greater
extent than pre-dissolution claims, pose special problems under most
corporate dissolution statutes, even where there has been full compli-
ance with statutory dissolution procedures.
Resolution of the problems by legislatures and by the courts is
required. The most difficult dilemma is presented when the physical
injury from a defective product occurs after the corporate assets have
been distributed among the shareholders. Since suing the corporation
then is an empty formality, such suits, if not barred, should not be
prerequisite to any otherwise available remedies against distributing
directors and recipient shareholders.
The allocation of risks, whether by statute or judicial decision,
should not depend on when technical "dissolution" occurs under the
applicable statutory formulation, but on the balancing of interests of
the injured person and of the dissolved corporation, its directors, and
shareholders. A compromise must be drawn between compensating
injured persons and settling the affairs of dissolved corporations. Fi-
nally, the solution should promote predictability and certainty.
The period for asserting claims against a corporation which is
being dissolved obviously should be sufficiently long to permit both
adequate winding up and due process to claimants and preferably
should precede the distribution of the assets of the corporation among
its shareholders. 226 To the extent of any assets distributed to share-
holders without adequate provision having been made for claims as-
serted during such period, whether technically pre- or post-"dissolu-
tion," the recipient shareholders should be liable up to their respective
distributions, with possible right of contribution against their fellow
recipient shareholders. Although many existing corporate statutes are
225 See text accompanying notes 24-27, 32-34, 43-62 & 68-69 supra; text accompanying
notes 229-31 infra.
226 This approach follows the New York dissolution procedure, as opposed to the
Model Act pattern under which dissolution follows winding up and precedes the two-year
suability period.
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capable of this construction, legislative clarification would seem desir-
able.
Post-dissolution "claims" that cannot be asserted against the cor-
poration because they arise after the suability period should not be
assertable against the distributing directors who neither knew nor
should have known of the claims and who, qua directors, hold no cor-
porate assets. Whether they should be assertable against recipient
shareholders is the ultimate question.
If the recipient shareholders are to be held liable, the "trust fund
theory," or a modem counterpart with a less controversial designa-
tion,227 is available for application to post-dissolution "claims" either
by the courts, or preferably, by legislation. On the other hand, if
recipient shareholders are not to be held liable, application of the
"trust fund theory" should be expressly negatived by legislation.
What forms, then, might a legislative solution take?
The corporation in dissolution, its directors, and shareholders
obviously would favor a very short suability period, commencing with
the beginning of the winding up period. Injured persons would urge
a longer period running from the time of physical harm and subject
to tolling. A very short period is more easily justified, of course, where
there is provision for written notice to known claimants and notice by
publication to any other possible claimants. 228
An acceptable compromise would be to have the period for the
assertion of claims run contemporaneously with the winding up
period 229 and be for at least two years or during winding up, whichever
227 See note 79 supra. See also note 222 supra.
228 This follows the New York procedure for the publication of notice and the
mailing of notice to known claimants. See notes 121-22 supra. In contrast, the Model Act
provides for the mailing of notice to each known creditor or the giving of notice
prescribed by the court. See notes 92 (due process requirements) 8- 102 supra.
The Pennsylvania statute (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2104(B) (Supp. 1971)) requires,
in addition to mailed notice to each known creditor and claimant of a corporation in
dissolution, notice by certified or registered mail to each municipality in which its regis-
tered office or principal place of business in the state is located. The statute also requires
publication of notice
in the county in which the registered office of the corporation is located once a
week for two successive weeks in two newspapers published in the English lan-
guage, one of which shall be a newspaper of general circulation and the other
the legal newspaper, if any, designated by the rules of court for the publication
of legal notices; otherwise, in two newspapers of general circulation published
in the county in which the registered office of the corporation is located.
Id.
229 Such a compromise would constitute a departure from the Model Act procedure
and would follow the New York pattern. The Model Act is presently inconsistent in this
respect. In the case of voluntary dissolution, the two-year suability period follows winding
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is longer. Only after two years (or any longer winding up period) might
articles of dissolution be filed. Upon the issuance of the certificate of
dissolution, the existence of the corporation would cease for all pur-
poses. Such a rule would shorten the time for the assertion of some
claims, especially those arising shortly before or during the winding
up period, and would preclude subsequent claims.
Claims arising after the winding up period should never be as-
serted under such a rule. This obvious hardship2 30 possibly can be
justified on the grounds that the acts of the corporation, upon which
the complaint is based, occurred more than two years before, when the
corporation was still carrying on business. The corporate personnel
involved might be difficult to trace, memories would be hazy, records
may have been lost, the allegedly defective product would have been
under the control of others for more than two years, and the purchaser
of the product, his family, household, guests, and possibly others would
have had unliquidated claims for breach of warranty for more than
two years.231 Such a rule would be no less Draconian than the result
under present dissolution statutes that expressly bars pre-dissolution
claims unknown to the corporation if such claims are not timely
asserted even though the claimant is unaware of the dissolution, under
the seventy-year old Connecticut general personal injuries statute of
limitations, 232 or under the statute of limitations section of the Securi-
up which precedes "dissolution." In the case of judicially supervised liquidation, winding
up and suability precede entry of the decree of dissolution.
Infancy or other incapacity should not lengthen the period since some qualified
person may assert the claim as the representative of the injured person. Actually, this
period would not be a statute of limitations but rather a limitation on the cause of
action, rendering tolling inapplicable.
230 "[I]t is all but unthinkable that a person should be time-barred from prosecuting
a cause of action before he ever had one." Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d
340, 346, 253 N.E.2d 207, 211, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969) (Breitel, J., Fuld, C.J. &
Gibson, J., dissenting).
This paradox is vividly expressed by Judge Frank:
Except in topsy-turvey land, you can't be born before you are conceived, or be
divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down
a house never built, or miss a train running on a nonexistent railroad. For
substantially similar reasons ...a statute of limitations does not begin to run
against a cause of action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial
remedy is available to the plaintiff.
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion)
(footnotes omitted).
231 See note 56 supra.
232 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1970); see note 69 supra. One notewriter
has suggested that products liability cases be subject to the following statute of limitations,
patterned after the Connecticut statute:
No action to recover damages from injury to the person or to real or personal
property caused by the use or consumption of a defective product shall be brought
except within one year of the date when the injury is sustained or discovered or
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ties Act of 1933.283
Under this approach, all claims, whether pre- or post-"dissolu-
tion," would receive similar treatment under the same comprehensive
corporate statutory provisions. Assuming compliance with statutory
dissolution procedures, the corporation would not be suable after the
winding up period. It would then be judgment proof since all of its
"net assets" would have been distributed to shareholders. However,
the distributing directors234 and recipient shareholders would be liable
for any distribution of corporate assets during the period to the preju-
dice of any creditor who asserts his claim before the end of the period.23 5
in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that
no such action may be brought more than five years from the date of the sale or
installation of the product by the party sought to be held.
Note, supra note 69, at 790-91. In support, the writer argues:
This statute attempts to attain a balance between the necessity of providing the
consumer with adequate time within which to discover a defect and institute an
action and the need to provide the manufacturer with a definite period of liability
and a date at which his susceptibility to suit terminates. The enactment of such a
statute would resolve the confusion in the area and furnish consumers, manufac-
turers, and the legal profession with a predictable, workable, and understandable
standard on which to base the selection and application of statutes of limitations
in products liability actions.
Id. at 791. Combining the Connecticut approach with the Model Act dissolution provi-
sions, a products liability statute of limitations could be drafted to read:
No action to recover damages caused by the use, or consumption, of a defective
product shall be commenced more than two years after the suffering of physical
harm by the plaintiff or after tender of delivery of goods by the defendant.
If such a statute of limitations were enacted, appropriate changes in the corporate
statute. dissolution provisions, and the Uniform Commercial Code, would also have to
be made to avoid inconsistencies.
233 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964):
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section
77k or 771(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of
the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liabil-
ity created under 771(1) of this title, unless brought within one year after the
violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be brought to
enforce a liability created under section 77k or 771(1) of this title more than three
years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section
771(2) of this title more than three years after the sale.
234 This would require deletion of the word "known" from statutory provisions such
as § 48(c) of the Model Act so that it would read substantially as follows:
(c) The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to any distribution
of assets of a corporation to its shareholders during the liquidation of the corpora-
tion without the payment and discharge of, or making adequate provision for,
all debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation shall be jointly and severally
liable to the corporation for the value of such assets which are distributed, to
the extent that such debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation are not
thereafter paid and discharged.
235 This would require deletion of the phrase "knowing such dividend or distribution
to have been made in violation of this Act" from such statutory provisions as the penulti-
mate paragraph of § 48 of the Model Act, so that it would read substantially as follows:
Any director against whom a claim shall be asserted under or pursuant to
this section for the payment of a dividend or other distribution of assets of a
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For any claims not timely asserted, whether arising before, during, or
after such period, neither the corporation, distributing directors, nor
its recipient shareholders would be liable.
To legislate this approach under the Model Act, two principal
changes236 would be necessary: (1) equate the winding up period with
the period for assertion of claims against the corporation (suability
period) and (2) equate the treatment of all claims against the corpora-
tion, whether technically pre- or post-"dissolution." Such a statutory
provision might read substantially as follows: 237
SECrION 105. TRmINATION OF REmDms AND CLA ms
The filing of a statement of intent to dissolve a corporation
shall not affect any remedy in favor of such corporation or against
it, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any claim, whether aris-
corporation and who shall be held liable thereon, shall be entitled to contribution
from the shareholders who accepted or received any such dividend or assets, in
proportion to the amounts received by them.
230 To implement such changes, a few other Model Act provisions, in addition to
those suggested in notes 233-34 supra, should be revised for the sake of consistency.
Section 87(a) should read:
The corporation shall immediately give notice thereof to be mailed to each known
creditor of the corporation, and shall publish such notice once a week for two
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published in the county
where the registered office of the corporation is situated.
Section 93 would require the insertion of "pending" in the last sentence, to read as
follows:
Upon the issuance of such certificate of dissolution the existence of the corpora-
tion shall cease, except for the purpose of pending suits and other proceedings
and appropriate corporate action by shareholders, directors and officers as provided
in this Act.
237 New York would have to transpose dissolution from the first to the final stage.
To accomplish this, several sections would have to be revised.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1004 (McKinney 1963): Deletion of "Upon such filing, the
corporation is dissolved."
Id. § 1005: Change of caption to read "Procedure after filing of certificate of dis-
solution"; change of first phrase in paragraph (a) "After dissolution" to "After the filing
of the certificate of dissolution"; and change of phrase in paragraph (b) "upon dissolution"
to "upon the filing of the certificate of dissolution."
Id. § 1006: Change of caption to conclude "after filing of certificate of dissolution";
change of phrase "as if dissolution had not taken place" to "as if the certificate of dis-
solution had not been filed"; substitution of phrases like "corporation in dissolution" for
"dissolved corporation" and of "filing of the certificate of dissolution" for "dissolution."
Id. § 1007(a): Change of "dissolution" to "the filing of the certificate of dissolution,"
and "six months" to "two years."
Id. § 1007(b): Insertion of phrase "including any claim alleged to have accrued
thereafter against the corporation," after "under section 1008."
Id. § 1007(e) (new subsection): "As of the day specified in the notice under subpara-
graph (a), the corporation is dissolved."
Id. § 1009: Conform captions in parentheses.
Id. § 1117: Conform captions in parentheses.
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ing before or after such filing, if action or other proceeding thereon
is commenced prior to the issuance of the certificate of dissolution.
After such issuance, no claim whatsoever may be asserted by such
corporation or against it, its directors, officers, or shareholders.
Absent statutory resolution, shareholders about to vote for dis-
solution with a view toward their eventual receipt of liquidation dis-
tributions might well join in Lady Macbeth's lament:238
'Tis safer to be that which we destroy
Than by destruction dwell in doubtful joy.
APPENDIX A
MODEL Acr DIssOLUTION PROCEDURE TIMETABLE*
(1969 Revision)
Pre-Dissolution Period
1. Filing of "statement of intent to dissolve" (§§ 85, 86):
(a) corporation to cease to carry on its business, except insofar
as may be necessary for winding up thereof (§ 86);
(b) corporate existence to continue until issue of certificate of dis-
solution or entry of decree dissolving corporation (§ 86).
2. Mailing of notice of filing to each known creditor of corporation
(§ 87(a)).
3. Payment by corporation of its liabilities (§ 87(b)).
4. After paying or adequately providing for payment of all its obliga-
288 W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MAcBETH, Act III, scene ii.
* The corporation, at any time during liquidation, may apply for
judicial supervision of liquidation (§§ 87(c), 97(c)). Involuntary or judicial
dissolution may be sought by the attorney general (§§ 94-96, 97(d)), a share-
holder (§ 97(a)), or a creditor (§ 97(b)); court may appoint a liquidating re-
ceiver (§§ 98, 99); corporate assets to be applied to expenses of liquidation
and payment of corporate liabilities, and any remaining assets to be dis-
tributed among shareholders (§ 98); court may require all creditors to file
claims within not less than four-month period and shall prescribe notice
to be given to creditors and claimants (§ 100); creditors and claimants failing
to file timely claims may be barred, by court order, from participating in
distribution of corporate assets (id.); when expenses of liquidation and all
liabilities of corporation shall have been paid and all of its remaining
assets distributed to its shareholders, or in case assets are not sufficient to
satisfy such expenses and liabilities, all assets have been exhausted, court
shall enter decree dissolving corporation, whereupon existence of corpora-
tion shall cease (§ 102); filing of certified copy of decree of dissolution with
secretary of state by court clerk (§ 103); two-year suability period on pre-
dissolution claims applicable to dissolution by decree of court when court
has not liquidated assets and business of corporation (§ 105).
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tions, distribution of remainder of its assets among shareholders(§ 87(b)).
5. Filing of "articles of dissolution" when all obligations of corporation
have been paid or adequate provision has been made therefor, and
all remaining assets of corporation have been distributed to its
shareholders (§ 92):
(a) that all liabilities of corporation have been paid or that ade-
quate provision has been made therefor (§ 92(c));
(b) that all remaining assets of corporation have been distributed
among its shareholders (§ 92(d));
(c) that no suits are pending against corporation or that adequate
provision has been made for satisfaction of any judgment which
may be entered against it in any pending suit (§ 92(e)).
Post-Dissolution Period
6. Upon issuance of "certificate of dissolution," corporate existence to
cease, except for purposes of suits, other proceedings, and other ap-
propriate corporate action by shareholders, directors, and officers as
provided in Act (§ 93).
7. Dissolution, either by issuance of certificate of dissolution, or by
court decree when court has not liquidated assets, or by expiration
of period of duration, not to impair any remedy by or against
corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, on any claim
incurred prior to such dissolution if action thereon is commenced
within two years after date of such dissolution (§ 105).
8. Corporate assets distributable to missing creditors or shareholders
to be deposited with state treasurer (§ 104).
APPENDIX B
NEW YORK DIssOLUTION PROCEDURE TimETABLE**
Post-Dissolution Period
1. Filing of "certificate of dissolution" (§ 1004):
(a) corporation dissolved upon such filing (id.);
(b) corporation to carry on no business except for purpose of
winding up (§ 1005(a)(1)).
2. Winding up (§ 1005(a)(2)).
3. Payment by corporation of its liabilities (§ 1005(a)(3)).
** At any time after the filing of the certificate of dissolution, the
corporation, or with court approval, any creditor, claimant, director, officer,
or shareholder may petition to continue liquidation under court super-
vision (§ 1008(a)). See note 121 supra.
Provisions of §§ 1005-08 applicable to corporation dissolved by expira-
tion of its period of duration or under Tax Law § 203(a) (§ 1009), and
subject to provisions of article 11 to judicial dissolution thereunder (§ 1117).
Judicial dissolution effective upon filing of final order of dissolution by
secretary of state (§ 1111(d)).
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
4. After paying or adequately providing for payment of its liabilities,
distribution of any remaining assets among its shareholders (§ 1005
(a)(3)(B)).
5. Dissolved corporation to function for purpose of winding up in
same manner as if dissolution had not taken place except as other-
wise provided in law or by court order (§ 1006(a)); e.g.,
(a) directors not to be deemed trustees of corporate assets and
title to such assets not to vest in them (§ 1006(a)(1));
(b) corporation may sue or be sued (§ 1006(a)(4)).
6. Dissolution not to affect any remedy by or against corporation, its
directors, officers, or shareholders on any claim existing or liability
incurred before such dissolution except as provided in §§ 1007-08
(§ 1006(b)).
7. Giving of notice requiring all creditors and claimants, including any
with unliquidated or contingent claims and any with whom corpora-
tion has unfulfilled contracts, to present claims within at least six-
month period (§ 1007(a)):
(a) mailing of notice to each person believed to be creditor or
claimant whose name and address are known or can with due
diligence be ascertained (§ 1007(a));
(b) publication of notice at least once a week for two successive
weeks in newspaper of general circulation in county in which
office of corporation was located at date of dissolution (id.).
8. Claims not timely filed or disallowed to be forever barred as against
corporation, its assets, directors, officers, and shareholders, except
to such extent, if any, as court may allow them against any remain-
ing assets of corporation in case of creditor who shows satisfactory
reason for failure to file his claim (§ 1007(b)).
9. Payment to state comptroller, as abandoned property, of assets dis-
tributable to missing creditors or shareholders (§ 1005(c)).
